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I. INTRODUCTION
All of us eat, wear clothes and occupy houses or apartments.
Many of us travel, seek entertainment at country clubs, night
clubs or sporting events and try to improve ourselves through
education. The norm is to pay for these items out of after-tax
income. A lucky few, however, get an affirmative answer to the
popular question, "Is it deductible?" and pay taxes only on
income left over after satisfying their needs or desires for one of
more of these items. This is a major advantage for an individual
in a high tax bracket. For example, if a consumption expendi-
ture is deductible, a taxpayer in the 50 percent bracket can
double his pleasure at the same out-of-pocket cost. Even if he
would rather not increase his use of the deductible item, there is
still a significant benefit.'
A. The Problem
The difficulty arises because
an individual is ... regarded for tax purposes as having
two personalities: one is a seeker after profit who can
deduct the expenses incurred in that search; the other is
a creature satisfying his needs as a human and those of
his family but who cannot deduct such consumption
and related expenditures.
2
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.B.A. 1957, City College
of New York; J.D. 1961, Harvard University. Member, New York Bar.
I For example, assume an individual decades he can afford to spend for entertain-
ment the amount left after the tax collector takes his share of $10,000 of income. If the
tax bite is 50%, there is $5000 left for such activity, yet when entertainment is deductible,
the entire $10,000 can be spent for this purpose. If instead the entertainment expendi-
ture were kept constant at $5000, there would be $2500 left from the $10,000 originally
set aside for entertainment for other purposes. That is:
Taxable income before entertainment $10,000
Entertainment deductible -5,000
Taxable income 5,000
Tax at 50% -2,500
Excess available $ 2,500
' I S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION,
CASES AND MATERIALS 496 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SURREY].
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In the words of the Internal Revenue Code, in determining
taxable income deductions are allowed for "all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business," 3 but "no deduction shall be
allowed for personal, living or family expenses."4 "But since the
individual remains one individual, where is that dividing line?"5
That is the question this Article seeks to answer.
The Internal Revenue Service and the courts have struggled
to reach a solution as to the deductibility of many kinds of
expenditures with very little guidance from Congress. In the
course of many years, rules of thumb have been developed;
unfortunately, if there is a rationale underlying these rules, it is
most often unarticulated. Furthermore, there has been little or
no effort to seek uniformity in the rules governing various types
of expenditures-as if the line drawn between personal and
business expenditures in one area has no bearing on where it
should be drawn when the issue arises in another.6 No doubt the
"inadequate distinction between consumption and business ex-
pense make some inequities unavoidable."' Some inequities,
perhaps, but must we swallow so easily the extent of unfairness
that presently exists? Can we explain the failure to articulate any
underlying principle to justify the rather arbitrary rules, or even
to discuss how decisions in one area relate to those in another?
It is particularly interesting to contrast the apparent liberal-
ity of the treatment of travel, meals, lodging and entertainment
with the strictness in the allowance of deductions for such items
as education, job-seeking costs and clothing. Perhaps there is a
personal benefit from a professional education at law school or
medical school, or even from a cram course taken to prepare for
the qualifying examination to become a certified public accoun-
tant that justifies denying a tax deduction for these expenditures.
But no one unattuned to the peculiarities of the tax law would
believe that the likelihood of personal benefit from such a short
3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162.
4 Id. § 262.
5 SUREY, supra note 2, at 496.
' Lee, Command Performance: The Tax Treatment of Employer Mandated Expenses, 7 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1972). For one of the rare cases where a court sought to justify what
appeared to be a distinction between two types of expenditures, see Henry C. Smith, 40
B.T.A. 1038 (1939), affd mem., 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940) (child care compared with
entertainment, traveling expenses and the cost of an actor's wardrobe).
7 H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 106-07 (1938). After reading Professor
Simons' book one is impressed with the difficulty of undertaking the task of this Article.
That author states: "There is here an essential and insuperable difficulty, even in
principle." Id. 123. See also id. 53-54.
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cram course exceeds the potential personal enjoyment from
viewing the Super Bowl or flying to a convention at Las Vegas.
As President Kennedy stated in 1961:
Too many firms and individuals have devised
means of deducting too many personal living expenses
as business expenses, thereby charging a large part of
their cost to the Federal Government ...
This is a matter of national concern, affecting not
only our public revenues, our sense of fairness, and our
respect for the tax system, but our moral and business
practices as well .... [T]he time has come when our tax
aws should cease their encouragement of luxury spend-
ing as a charge on the Federal Treasury ....
... Even though in some instances entertainment
and related expenses have an association with the needs
of business, they nevertheless confer substantial tax-free per-
sonal benefits to the recipients ...
I, therefore, recommend that the cost of such busi-
ness entertainment and the maintenance of entertain-
ment facilities (such as yachts and hunting lodges) be
disallowed in full as a tax deduction and that restrictions
be imposed on the deductibility of. . . expenses of
business trips, combined with vacations, and excessive
personal living expenses incurred on business travel
away from home.8
According to Secretary of the Treasury Dillon, the
President's disallowance proposals were justified because: "The
characteristic feature of all of these expenses is that they confer
substantial personal benefits which are in large measure a substi-
tute for personal living expenses."9 Apparently, however, despite
this personal consumption, it is necessary to accept a tax deduc-
tion for entertainment expenses reasonably associated with the
production of income since
expenses incurred for valid business purposes should
not be discouraged since such expenses serve to increase
business income, which in turn produces additional tax
revenues for the Treasury. If valid business expenses
were to be disallowed as a deduction (particularly ex-
penses associated with selling functions), there might be
8 Hearings on Tax Recommendations of the President Contained in His Message Transmitted
to Congress, April 20, 1961 Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
12-13 (1961) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. For more details of the
President's proposals see notes 165, 201, 212 infra.
9 Hearings, supra note 8, at 43.
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a substantial loss of revenue where business transactions
are discouraged, or where they fail to be consum-
mated.1"
Thus, Congress responded to the President's urging that
"[t]he slogan-'It's deductible'"11 should pass from our scene
only by requiring a closer connection between the entertainment
expenditure and the potential business advantage, 12 and by
insisting upon substantiation of entertainment expenditures in-
stead of the rough approximations previously allowed under the
Cohan rule.1
3
One is struck, however, by the failure to apply this reasoning
to other expenditures which involve mixed business and per-
sonal motives. If a deduction for entertainment expenditures
reasonably designed to produce income must be allowed, regard-
less of the accompanying personal benefit, do not similar consid-
erations require a deduction for the less obviously personal costs
of education in medicine or law, or even an undergraduate
degree in such fields as business or engineering? If a business-
man can assert that his taxable income would be overstated and
his income-seeking behavior inhibited if he were not permitted
to deduct the legitimate business-generating cost of entertaining
customers, cannot the attorney who is prohibited from deducting
his law school tuition or even the cost of a bar review cram
course similarly state that his lifetime professional income is not
as great as the tax collector is asserting?
B. Summary of a Proposal
The position that a deduction ought to be allowed for all
income-generating expenses, while quite correct, is really beside
the point. If such expenditures actually provide personal satis-
faction, the amount of such satisfaction ought to be included in
income. The fairest income tax would take account of income
10 S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 CuM. BULL.
707, 731 [hereinafter cited as S. REP.].
1 Hearings, supra note 8, at 13.
12 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 274. As the House put it in describing its version, which
was tougher than what was eventually enacted, "the taxpayer must show a greater degree
of proximate relation between the expenditure and his trade or business than is required
under present law." H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1962), reprinted in
1962-3 CuM. BULL. 405, 424 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.]. For more details see text
accompanying notes 213-23 infra.
13 Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930). The court held that where
the evidence indicated that a taxpayer had incurred deductible expenditures, but their
exact amount could not be determined, the court must make "as dose an approximation
as it can" rather than disallow the deduction entirely. Id. at 544.
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from "whatever source derived." 14 On-the-job entertainment,
traveling expenses and other expenditures which but for their
connection with income-generating activities would be consi-
dered to provide personal satisfaction should not be distin-
guished from other forms of enjoyment.
An indirect way of taxing these benefits is to deny a deduc-
tion to the extent personal satisfaction has been obtained from
the expenditure. If satisfaction were equal to cost, this approach
would suggest complete disallowance. This reasoning is the
foundation of this Article's conclusion in Part II that, assuming
perfect information and absence of administrative problems, a
deduction should be permitted only to the extent that the costs
incurred exceed the personal benefit obtained. The proposal
does not, therefore, represent a challenge to the right to a
deduction for expenditures intended to produce income.
There are two difficult questions raised by this suggestion.
First, does not such a broad approach also require the taxation
of such things as leisure, personal relationships, and the prestige
and other satisfactions that come from one's job? Thus, it might
be argued that the pleasures from on-the-job entertainment are
indistinguishable from other less tangible satisfactions many
people derive from their work, and it is illogical or, worse, unfair
to tax one and not the other. While it does not seem feasible to
go so far, the approach suggested in this Article is not precluded
by this problem.'
5
The second difficulty is inability to measure personal enjoy-
ment or consumption accurately in light of the coincidence of
business and personal motives. For example, if a couple goes to a
restaurant for purely personal reasons and pays $25 for dinner,
it can be assumed they expect to get at least $25 worth of
personal satisfaction. However, if there is a business motive, such
as the possibility of generating additional income in excess of the
$25 cost, one might well buy the meal even if it is not worth the
$25 in the form of consumption. Therefore, it is not clear how
much satisfaction the dinner is producing. Moreover, since this
value will vary from case to case and can be anything down to
zero, it is impossible to make individualized measurements.
Despite this difficulty, the development of a theoretically
correct approach does enable one to draw some conclusions
14 U.S. CONS. amend. XVI; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61.
15See text accompanying notes 40-51, 70 infra.
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about the appropriateness of particular practical rules. This
proposition is tested in Part IV, in which current law is analyzed
in order to ascertain the extent to which it is consistent with the
principle that all personal benefit should be taxed. The proce-
dure for undertaking this analysis is developed in Part III. The
approach suggested in this Article would be easiest to apply in
cases in which satisfaction equals cost or is so minimal that it can
be ignored. Part III suggests some factors which would tend to
show the existence of either of these conditions. Moreover, it
argues that it is not necessary to have complete assurance that
personal satisfaction equals cost in order to make this assumption
for purposes of taxation. While undoubtedly this will lead to
overtaxation in some circumstances, such a result is far more
acceptable than the understatement of income which results
from ignoring the personal benefit. Of course, there will be
many circumstances in which the matter is completely in doubt,
and some sort of arbitrary allocation or partial taxation may be
the best solution available. The conclusion reached by this Arti-
cle, summarized in Part V, is that the law should be liberalized in
the area of education and job-seeking costs, and that it should be
tightened with respect to the deductibility of expenses for travel,
entertainment, meals and lodging, and home offices.
C. Some Related Matters Not Discussed Herein
There are a number of related issues which will not be dealt
with here. For the most part, no distinction will be made between
those business expenses which are currently deductible and those
which should be capitalized,'16 since such a distinction does not
raise the threshhold business-personal issue with which this Arti-
16 Some cases have refused to allow education costs to be amortized, ruling that they
are personal. Bernard V. Hall, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1363 (1970); Nathaniel A.
Denman, 48 T.C. 439 (1967). See David N. Bodley, 56 T.C. 1357 (1971). It has been
argued, however, that such results are explicable on the ground that the estimated useful
life of the education cannot be determined. Wolfman, Professors and the "Ordinrmy and
Necessary" Business Expense, 112 U. PA. L. Rav. 1089, 1093, 1098, 1112 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Expense]. Nevertheless, while the Internal Revenue Service and the courts have
been quite strict in insisting upon proof of the useful life of intangible assets such as
goodwill or of contracts which are generally renewed, Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1956); see
B. BITTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GiFr TAXATION 329-30 (4th ed.
1972), it would seem that the length of the period over which education will be useful in
the business can be estimated with reasonable accuracy based upon life expectancy or
normal retirement age. Thus, in a closely analogous situation, a fee paid by a physician to
a hospital in exchange for a nontransferable lifetime privilege to use the hospital's
facilities has been held to be amortizable over the physician's life expectancy. Glenn L.
Heigerick, 45 T.C. 475 (1966); Rev. Rul. 70-171, 1970-1 CUM. BuLL. 55. See Wolfman,
The Cost of Education and the Federal Income Tax, 42 F.R.D. 535, 547-48 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Education]. See text accompanying notes 95-97 infra.
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cle is concerned. There is also no treatment of commuting and
child-care expenses. The nondeductibility of these expenditures
is probably not caused by any doubt that these expenses are
business related, but by the belief that they are based on underly-
ing personal decisions which give rise to personal satisfaction.
Thus, what makes commuting costs nondeductible is the assump-
tion that they are caused by the personal decision to live in the
suburbs and not within walking distance of work. 17 Similarly, the
necessity of incurring child-care expenses is dependent, at least
in some circumstances, on an initial personal choice to have
children.' 8 This Article, in contrast, focuses on the personal
satisfaction derived from the expenditure itself. Additionally, it
is impossible to discuss the deductibility of child-care expendi-
tures without considering such policy issues as whether the
bearing of children and the employment of married women
should be encouraged. These aspects of the problem are incon-
sistent with the focus of this Article 9 upon the allowance of
deductions under principles which seek only an accurate deter-
mination of net income.
17 See generally Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80
HARv. L REv. 925, 953 n.46 (1967). The constant refrain that the cost of commuting to
work is not deductible, Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-2(e) (1958), 1.212-1(f) (1957), 1.262-1(b)(5)
(1958), is broken by an allowance of the cost of transporting tools where the taxpayer
commutes by automobile only because of the heavy load, Rev. Rul. 63-100, 1963-1 Cum.
BULL. 34; see Fausner v. Commissioner, 413 U.S. 838 (1973). The suggested rationale for
denying the deductibility of the expense of commuting does not support this concession.
If the taxpayer lived next door to the job, it would not be very expensive to transport the
tools. The necessity to drive further than this with the tools is a result of personal choice.
However, if it were possible to examine each individual decision to determine if
there was actually an opportunity to live closer, it would be proper to permit commuting
deductions. See Wright v. Hartsell, 305 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1962); Klein, Income Taxation
and Commuting Expenses: Tax Policy and the Need for Nonsimplistic Analysis of "Simple"
Problems, 54 CORNELL L. Rnv. 871 (1969). Professor Klein reasonably suggests that a
taxpayer who would be allowed a deduction for the cost of meals and lodging because,
for example, he obtained a temporary job away from his normal place of work, should be
allowed to deduct the cost of commuting, if instead of living apart from his family he
chose to travel the extra distance daily or several times per week. There are indications
the Commissioner agrees. See Rev. Rul. 190, 1953-2 Cum. BULL. 303. More controversial
is Professor Klein's tentative suggestion that low income people could well be allowed to
deduct the cost of commuting, because their choice of residence is likely to be severely
restricted and their only real decision is where to work. These people did not make a
personal choice to live far from the job.
" Klein, Tax Deductions for Family Care Expenses, 14 B.C. IND. & Comm. L REv. 917
(1973). Even if one were to conclude that the decision to have children is not the kind of
personal decision which will shut off the possibility of a deduction, baby-sitting can still be
rejected as a business expense on the analysis that, at least under some circumstances, the
purely personal benefits obtained from having a baby-sitter for the children are well
worth the costs incurred.
19 These questions also have been adequately treated elsewhere. See Feld,Deductibility
of Expenses for Child Care and Household Services: New Section 214, 27 TAX L. REv. 415
(1972); Hjorth, A Tax Subsidyfor Child Care: Sec. 210 of the Internal Revenue Act of 1971, 50
TAxEs 133 (1972); Klein, supra note 18. See also Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A
Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 49
(1971) (written prior to the 1971 changes).
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II. THE THEORETICALLY CORRECT RESULT
In order to test the hypothesis that personal satisfaction
should not escape inclusion in income merely because it is
obtained in the course of business, it is useful to develop the set
of circumstances in which the issue discussed in this paper may
arise, and to evaluate the acceptability under these conditions of
the rules which are now being used or which may be suggested.
In order to make the illustrations more forceful, hypothetical
taxpayers named in accordance with the relative strengths of
their business and personal interests will be described. The
taxpayer could be motivated solely by either business (All Busi-
ness) or personal (Solely Pleasure) considerations. In other cases
both reasons would be present, but only one would be
sufficiently strong to justify the act by itself (Enough Business or
Sufficient Pleasure). In still other situations both the personal
and business value would be great enough even if the other did
not exist (Either Alone). It is also possible that neither reason
alone would be sufficient, but in combination they provide
enough impetus (Neither Alone).
The motivations of these six taxpayers will be described in
greater detail, after which their entitlement to a deduction under
several possible tests will be discussed. These tests can be briefly
described as follows:
1. Business Benefit-A deduction would be allowed to
the extent of the amount that would have been
spent solely for business purposes.
2. Lack of Consumption-A deduction would be al-
lowed only to the extent the expenditure exceeds
the amount that would have been spent for personal
satisfaction.
3. Motivation-A deduction would be allowed:
a) If the principal purpose of the expenditure was
business.
b) Only if the expenditure would have been made
regardless of personal reasons.
c) If the expenditure would not have been made in
the absence of business reasons.
4. Allocation-A partial deduction would be allowed,
equal to the ratio of the amount that would have
been spent for business purposes to the total of the
business and personal values.
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A. Some Examples
As stated above, the possibilities as to the mixture of busi-
ness and personal motivations for certain behavior can best be
examined by presenting six individuals, All Business, Enough
Business, Neither Alone, Either Alone, Sufficient Pleasure and
Solely Pleasure, each of whom have the opportunity to purchase
two tickets to a local professional football game for $25.20 They
each decide to go to the game and take along Mr. X. X is a
neighbor, who also happens to work for a company which is a
potential buyer of the product manufactured by the business
individually owned by the particular taxpayer. In order to dem-
onstrate that the issues are the same with respect to different
types of expenditures, the same six individuals will also be
examined as they face a choice between college and an im-
mediate business career.
All Business hates football, and would not ordinarily buy a
ticket to a game even if one were available for $1 or even; ',. In
fact, even if he enjoyed football, he finds it so distasteful to be
with X that in the absence of business considerations, he would
not pay anything for any entertainment if he had to be in X's
presence to take advantage of it. However, All knows how much
X loves football, and that he has been wanting to go to this
particular game. He figures the investment of $25 and his time is
well worth it in view of the potential business X can throw his
way.
All Business hates to study, and expects no personal enjoy-
ment or benefit from college. However, when he considers his
prospects for employment, he decides that in terms of the likely
increase in his earning power, the money required for a college
degree is well worth it.
Enough Business also calculates that the potential business
he can obtain through X is well worth the $25 expenditure on
the football tickets. Aside from these considerations, Enough
does not get sufficient enjoyment from football to spend $25 for
two tickets. However, he would as a purely personal matter jump
at the chance to go to the game if the two tickets were available
for $10.
Enough Business comes to the same conclusion as All Busi-
20 This approach was suggested by Professor Klein's article on travel expenses, which
discusses counterparts of at least Neither Alone and Either Alone. Klein, The Deductibility
of Transportation Expenses of a Combination Business and Pleasure Trp--A Conceptual Analysis,
18 STAN. L. REv. 1099 (1966).
19741
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:859
ness concerning the economic value of a college degree. How-
ever, unlike All he expects some personal enjoyment and benefit
which, while not equal to the full cost of a college education, is
worth something to him. Thus, Enough Business is one who
expects some personal enjoyment, although less than full cost,
but who values the business benefit enough to act for this reason
alone.
Neither Alone assumes that there is some chance that taking
X to the football game will improve his opportunity of obtaining
business from X's employer, but while he would spend something
for this possibility, it is not worth the required $25 outlay. On the
other hand, while Neither likes football and enjoys the company
of his neighbor X, from the purely personal standpoint he would
not spend $25 for the tickets. Nevertheless, when Neither Alone
adds together the amount of enjoyment he expects and the
business potential, he decides that the tickets are worth $25.
Neither Alone is not much for studies but most of his
friends and family have gone or are contemplating going to
college, and he suspects his future personal relationships will be
hampered by the absence of a college education. However, when
he thinks of the cost of a college education in terms of time and
money, Neither thinks that he will risk this hindrance. Yet, when
it comes to looking for work, Neither Alone finds that the things
he wants to do all require a college degree. Even though evi-
dence would indicate that the present value of Neither's in-
creased earnings potential through the college degree is in excess
of the cost of the college education, Neither is not that farsighted
and he is thinking of settling for a lesser job rather than facing
four years of college. However, after long thought, Neither
determines that the combined personal and job benefits are
worth the investment in time and money. Thus, in Neither's case
personal and business values could each range from minor
amounts to almost, although not quite, enough to justify the
expenditure for one of the reasons alone, but the sum of the two
,alues is at least equal to market.
Either Alone, like All and Enough Business, thinks that
taking X to a game will soften him up substantially, and that the
$25 expenditure will be a cheap way to gain additional business.
Unlike All and Enough, however, Either Alone is a great lover of
football and enjoys X's company immensely. Therefore, he
would have bought the tickets and taken X to the game even if X
worked in a wholly unrelated field.
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Either Alone thinks college is worth the time and tuition
both for the personal satisfaction to be obtained and for the
effect it would have on his potential income. In sum, Either
Alone expects sufficient personal satisfaction to act in the ab-
sence of business motives, but he also expects enough of a return
to justify the expenditure even if personal satisfaction were not a
factor.
Sufficient Pleasure is similar to Either Alone in his love for
football and his friendship for X; he would buy the tickets for
purely personal reasons. He does think that there is some chance
he will gain business as a result of the day's activities, but he
would not pay $25 for this possibility.
Sufficient Pleasure wants to go to college to improve his
mind. Perhaps it will improve his economic potential but
Sufficient, who really expects to go into his father's business,
doesn't think much of that aspect, although he would pay some
part of the tuition to achieve this end. Thus, Sufficient Pleasure
is one who expects some business return although not enough to
justify the full expenditure, but who expects enough personal
satisfaction to act for this reason alone.
Solely Pleasure is similar to Either Alone and Sufficient
Pleasure in his love for football and in his enjoyment of X's
company. Solely thinks that there is little or no chance he will
gain any business by the effort, and from the business point of
view, does not think that any expenditure is justified.
Solely Pleasure thinks of himself as a potential artisan. He is
convinced going to college will not increase his earning potential
at all, but decides to go because of the personal benefits. In
short, Solely acts only for personal satisfaction and takes no
account of business factors.
B. Possible Tests
Given this range of factual situations, who among the six
individuals is entitled to a full or partial deduction for the cost of
the football tickets or the college education? At least four possi-
ble approaches to this question can be suggested.
1. Business Benefit
The focus could be on the relationship of the activity to the
taxpayer's business.2 1 Under this approach, a deduction would
21 See Wolfman, Education, supra note 16, at 547-49.
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be allowed for the amount that the taxpayer would have spent
for business purposes. As discussed above, the committee report
issued in connection with the 1962 amendments with respect to
the deduction of entertainment expenses is in accord with this
approach.
22
Given the requisite connection, an expenditure would be
deductible under this rule even if it would have been made in
the absence of a business motive, or even if the primary motiva-
tion were personal. Thus, under this test, Either Alone would be
entitled to a full deduction as well as All and Enough Business;
Neither Alone and Sufficient Pleasure would be entitled to a
partial deduction of up to $24.99 for the $25 football tickets,
depending upon the amount they would be willing to spend for
business purposes.
2. Lack of Consumption
Taking the cue from section 262 of the Internal Revenue
Code, which provides that no deduction shall be allowed for
personal, living and family expenses, a deduction could be de-
nied to the extent that the individual derives a personal benefit
from the transaction. The tax treatment of college and profes-
sional education is consistent with a belief that a deduction
should be disallowed whenever there seems to be a reasonable
possibility of personal satisfaction.
Personal satisfaction should be measured by that amount not
in excess of the market price which a person would be willing to
pay in the absence of business considerations, and not by an
attempted measurement of actual enjoyment. Thus, someone
might possibly derive $1,000 of enjoyment from a vacation that
costs $500 in the sense that if asked after, or even before, a trip
what he would pay for it, he would say $1,000. Yet satisfaction in
excess of the amount paid would not be deemed to be income.
Nor would a loss be. permitted if he got only $200 worth of
vacation for the $500 expenditure. Thus, the amount that would
have been paid seems the crucial measure of satisfaction. 23
Under this approach, only All Business would get a full
deduction. Either Alone, Sufficient Pleasure and Solely Pleasure,
2
1See text accompanying note 10 supra.
23 H. SIMONS, supra note 7, at 53, 120. The economist refers to the excess of personal
valuation over market price as consumer surplus. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 436-38 (9th
ed. 1973). For an explanation of this term, see Aaron, What is a Comprehensive Tax Base
Anyway?, 22 NA'L TAX J. 543, 548-49 (1969). The casualty loss deduction, INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 165(c)(3), may suggest, however, that actual enjoyment is in some cases
relevant to taxability.
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who obtain satisfaction to the extent of cost, would not be
entitled to any deduction. Note in particular the dramatic differ-
ence for Either Alone, who is allowed a full deduction under the
business benefit approach and none under this approach.
In the case of Enough Business and Neither Alone, the
personal benefit is less than the costs involved, and some deduc-
tion seems justified. Depending on the particular circumstances,
this could range from almost the entire $25 cost of the football
tickets to as little as a penny.
3. Motivation
A third approach would consider the taxpayer's mo-
tivation.24 There are various ways a purpose test could be
stated.
a. Principal Purpose
A deduction could be permitted only if the business reason
was the principal purpose of the transaction. 25 Under this ap-
proach, All and Enough Business would be entitled to a deduc-
tion while Sufficient and Solely Pleasure would not, since the
primary motivation of the last two is clearly personal. Insufficient
facts are given to make this determination in the case of Neither
Alone or Either Alone, and it is likely that Neither and Either
themselves would not know which factor is the most important.
To further illustrate Either's situation, assume the current
rent for an eight room house is $480 per month, or $60 per
room. Either Alone determines to rent such a house in lieu of a
seven room house he was considering at $420 per month. Either,
an attorney, brings work from the office occasionally and uses
the extra room as an office and also as a guest room. Even if
Either Alone did not work at home, he would have wanted the
eighth room because of the frequency with which he has over-
night guests. Similarly, the office use is so important to him that
he would have acquired the eighth room solely for this purpose.
Use of the eighth room for these two purposes can be carried
out without their interfering with each other.
It is assumed that Either Alone would spend at least the
extra $60 for a guest room or for a home office, even if each
24 H. SIMONS, supra note 7, at 54.
25 See text accompanying notes 55, 153-55, 210 infra; Leonard F. Cremona, 58 T.C:
219, 223 (1972) (Tannenwald, J., concurring); R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
98 (1964); McNulty, Tax Policy and Tuition Credit Legislation: Federal Income Tax Allowances
for Personal Costs of Higher Education, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1, 28 (1973).
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reason existed independently of the other. In order to ascertain
which purpose is more important, it is necessary to isolate each
purpose and ask how much Either would be willing to spend for
the eighth room. If he stops at $60 for the guest room but states
that the office is worth $70, then his principal purpose is busi-
ness and the deduction would be allowed. If the opposite were
true, the deduction would be disallowed.
Turning now to Neither Alone, assume he is offered a job in
Phoenix for $1,000 a year more than he is earning in New York.
The extra income alone does not seem to.justify a move, but
Neither, having visited Phoenix, is convinced that he would like
to live there. While he did not think of moving in the absence of
this job offer, the combination of the extra money and the
inviting climate is enough to induce Neither to move. If it is
assumed that the cost of a move to Phoenix is $5,000, it is clear
that the sum of the business and personal gain is at least $5,000.
However, while the maximum and minimum valuation of either
could be $4,999" or $1, respectively, the effectuation of the
predominant purpose, if there was one, must be valued by
Neither Alone in excess of $2,500. If one could determine that
the additional income would cause Neither Alone to spend
$3,000 to move to Phoenix, while he values the advantage in
climate at only $2,750, then the principal purpose test would
suggest that the full $5,000 of moving costs should be deductible.
b. Business Reasons Sufficient
A deduction could be allowed whenever business reasons
alone would have caused the transaction to take place. This
approach, like the business benefit approach first discussed,
permits a deduction for All and Enough Business and Either
Alone, who had sufficient business reasons for going to the
football game or attending college. However, unlike the business
benefit approach, it would not sanction a partial deduction for
Neither Alone or Sufficient Pleasure.
c. Business Reasons Necessary
A deduction could be permitted whenever business is a
motivating factor in the sense that personal reasons alone would
not cause the transaction to take place. This approach is closely
related to the lack of consumption test and results in a deduction
for All and Enough Business and Neither Alone, who would not
have gone to the football game or college in the absence of
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business reasons. Either Alone and the Pleasures achieve enough
personal satisfaction to justify the transaction in any event and
would be denied a deduction.
4. Allocation
Recognition that both business and personal interests are
involved could suggest a fourth approach; namely, allocation
based on the relative value of each. Thus, if the personal value of
an activity were known to be $5,000, while the business value was
$10,000, a deduction for two thirds of the cost, whatever it might
be, could be allowed. Alternatively, even if one could not quan-
tify the separate valuations, it would still be possible to proceed
on this basis if the relationship of the valuations were somehow
known, or there were a willingness to "guesstimate."
This method would explain section 274(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code, which under certain circumstances requires an
allocation of the cost of foreign travel based upon the number of
days devoted to business as compared to the total elapsed time of
the trip. The assumption appears to be that a comparison of the
number of days spent on each gives a fair approximation of the
relative business and personal valuations.26
C. Summary of Results
The results under the various rules suggested above may be
summarized in the following chart:
All Enough Neither Either Sufficient Solely
Business Business Alone Alone Pleasure Pleasure
Business bene-
fit Yes Yes Part Yes Part No
Business rea-
sons suffi-
cient Yes Yes No Yes No No
Lack of con-
sumption Yes Part Part No No No
Business rea-
sons neces-
sary Yes Yes Yes No No No
Principal pur-
pose Yes Yes Maybe Maybe No No
Allocation Yes Part Part Part Part No
The chart indicates that the Alones27 are subject to the most
26See Klein, supra note 20. For a detailed discussion of allocation of travel expenses
see text accompanying notes 165-69, 183 infra.2 7 As has been noted, however, the valuational differences between Enough Business
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conflicting results, and it may be useful to highlight these differ-
ences in the search for the correct rule.
Suppose that the cost of college tuition is $10,000. Neither
Alone thinks that it is worth $7-,000 from a business standpoint,
and that he would pay $4,000 to make himself a more interesting
person. The resulting deductions are shown in the chart below.
If the student were Either Alone, and he had decided that
college was worth $10,000 from either the personal or business
standpoint, as the chart indicates, the business benefit approach
allows a full deduction and the consumption approach permits
no deduction. The principal purpose route could go either way.
An allocation based upon relative values of each would, assum-
ing relatively equal valuations, allow a deduction for about fifty
percent of the cost.
DEDUCTION ALLOWED
Approach Neither Either
Business benefit $ 7,000 $10,000
Business reasons sufficient 0 10,000
Lack of consumption 6,000 0
Business reasons necessary 10,000 0
Principal purpose 10,000 ?
Allocation 6,364 5,000
D. Resolving the Conflict
Reliance on motivation to determine whether an expendi-
ture will be deducted in full or not at all will produce extremely
arbitrary results. The primary purpose test could, in the case of
Neither Alone, allow a $10,000 deduction for the cost of educa-
tion even though business considerations would cause him to
spend only $7,000. On the other hand, if the situation were
reversed and Neither Alone would spend $7,000 for personal
satisfaction and $4,000 to produce income, a deduction would be
denied even though there was some business benefit and con-
sumption did not equal the full outlay. In the case of Either
Alone, who has both a personal and business valuation at least
equal to cost, it would be necessary to determine how much more
or Sufficient Pleasure and the Alones may be slight. For example, if an activity costs $100,
they may value it as follows:
Business Value Personal Value Category
100 99 Enough Business
99 99 Neither Alone
100 100 Either Alone
99 100 Sufficient Pleasure
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than cost he would be willing to spend for either purpose and,
depending on the result, to allow the entire amount to be
deducted or none at all. These results are hard to defend.
If a deduction were allowed only when business reasons
alone would cause the expenditure in question, Neither Alone,
despite a business motive which would cause him to spend
$7,000 on education, would get no deduction because he would
not have gone to college unless he also sought personal satisfac-
tion. Since Neither Alone might spend as much as $9,999 for
business reasons, it can be seen that this test also can be arbitrary.
Allowance of a full deduction whenever business is a neces-
sary factor denies a deduction to Either Alone, who would spend
$10,000 for business purposes, but grants Neither Alone a full
$10,000 deduction despite the fact that he would only spend
$7,000 in the pursuit of income. Since Neither's personal valua-
tion could be as high as $9,999, the allowance of a full deduction
whenever business is a motivating factor is again likely to be
highly arbitrary and could even produce a full deduction when
business reasons played a very minor role.
As should be clear, the last-mentioned rule would allow a
business deduction for any expenditure that would not have
been made for personal reasons alone. Thus, if a person would
not go to a night club at regular prices in the absence of business
reasons, he would, if he went in connection with business, get a
deduction for the full cost. If he would not eat at a restaurant for
personal reasons alone, he could deduct the full cost of the meal,
or-at least the excess over what it would cost to eat at home. The
difficulty with this approach it that it ignores the consumption
which has occurred. The fact that someone would not spend $20
to eat dinner in a good restaurant does not mean that he attaches
no personal satisfaction to the meal. It just means that its
personal value is less than the market price and therefore he
spends his money in other ways. He may very well be willing to
purchase the meal for $10, $15 or even $19.99.
It is evident that examination of whether business or per-
sonal reasons are a motivating, or the principal motivating,
factor cannot lead one to a logical answer, at least ii an unreal
world in which all valuations can be accurately measured. A test
based on motivation must, if it is logical at all, represent an
attempt to approximate more reasonable results. 28 However, the
analysis so far presented does not enable one to choose between
the remaining approaches.
28 Compare Klein, supra note 20, at 1109, with souirces cited note 25 supra.
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It seems correct to allow a deduction for an expenditure
which is intended to produce income. On the other hand, there
is a clear admonition against a deduction for personal living
expenses or the enjoyment of consumption out of pre-tax dol-
lars. Thus, either approach is logical, at least on its face. Is there
actually a conflict? Should an allocation approach be used as a
compromise between two equally correct solutions? Or can a
solution be derived from an examination of the fundamental
purpose and proper form of the income tax?
E. A Suggested Approach
1. The Definition of Income
Under the widely accepted Haig-Simons analysis, income is
defined as "the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights
exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the
store of property rights between the beginning and end of the
period in question. 29 More simply, this may be expressed as the
sum of personal consumption plus increase in individual net
worth.
Treatment of all forms of income alike, as the Simons
formulation suggests, contributes to the fairness of the tax law by
treating similarly people in approximately the same economic
circumstances (horizontal equity), and by fairly distributing the
cost of the government among income classes (vertical equity).30
It also avoids the distortion in the use and allocation of resources
which arises if certain forms of income receive preferential
treatment.3 I As Professor Andrews has stated, Simons' emphasis
on consumption tells us that the key to income measurement is
the taxpayer's participation in the distribution of goods and
services, not his contribution to the production of such goods.32
In the present context, this suggests that someone who has
enjoyed travel and entertainment, albeit in connection with his
job, has participated in the distribution sector and should be
subject to taxation. One could object to the taxation of such
on-the-job benefits on the ground that the arrangements could
be made solely out of the desire to produce income, with no
29 H. SIMONS, supra note 7, at 50.
"oJ. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 5, 67 (rev. ed. 1971).
31 Id. 67.
32 Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REv. 309, 324
(1972).
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interest in providing personal satisfaction to the employee. But
under our tax system, as a general rule, the manner in which one
has obtained property does not affect taxability.33 Thus, $1,000
found on the street or in the drawer of an old desk purchased at
an auction for $50 is taxable.34 The motivation of the person
who lost the cash is irrelevant.35
Moreover, it seems clear that the employer's motive is always
to produce income and only incidentally to benefit the employee.
Thus, an employer pays a salary of $5,000, $10,000 or $50,000 a
year because that is the amount considered necessary to attract a
particular employee and keep him working in a, productive
manner. Yet the salary, of course, is income. The same can be
said for benefits in kind. As Professor Bittker put it: "[tihe
benefit to the employee is no less real because it is a by-product
of the employer's requirements.
'36
The salary will not be effective, of course, unless the em-
ployee desires it. The other on-the-job benefits discussed above
are distinguishable in that the employer's aim can be satisfied
even though the employee gets no personal benefit.3 7 For exam-
ple, an employer could determine that Jones vould be a more
valuable employee if he took some courses leading to a college
degree. Although Jones may be indifferent to the personal
benefits of college, the employer may still get his money's worth.
" Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
3 Cesarini v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ohio 1969), aff'd, 428 F.2d 812
(6th Cir. 1970); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14 (1957); Rev. Rul. 61, 1953-1 Cum. BULL. 17. See
Comment, Taxation of Found Property and Other Windfalls, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 748 (1953).
The payor's motivation is important in determining whether a particular transfer
is a gift and if so not taxable as income. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278
(1960). The reasons for this approach are unclear. Perhaps a gift from father to son or
husband to wife should be considered a sharing of income earned by the husband rather
than a transfer. R. GOODE, supra note 25, at 101. Perhaps it is felt to be more efficient to
deal with gifts under a gift or inheritance tax which does not create the potential problem
which existts under an income tax if an unusually large amount of income is received in
one year. These considerations would not apply to the taxation of fringe benefits in kind.
In any event, it would seem clear that even gifts outside the family unit, at least if made
in a business context, should be taxable income under an income tax. See 3 REPORT OF
THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION (CANADA) 465 (1966) [hereinafter cited as CARTER
REPORT].
" Bittker, The Individual as Wage Earner, N.Y.U. 11TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 1147, 1156
(1953). See Joseph L. Doran, 21 T.C. 374, 376 (1953).
" Of course, it might not always be so obvious that the employee's personal valuation
is irrelevant to the employer's aim. Thus assume Swinger is a salesman who has an
expense account which enables him to entertain customers at night clubs and theaters.
Perhaps the employer's aim is met if the customer has a good time regardless of how
Swinger values the free food, drink and entertainment. On the other hand, the oppor-
tunity to participate in these activities may influence the size of Swinger's compensation
package. If Swinger likes it, he could probably be hired at a lower salary. On the other
hand, if he dislikes the entertaining he might insist on an extra payment in the nature of
combat pay. See text accompanying note 67 infra.
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This would not be true if Jones were indifferent to a raise in
salary. Thus employer motivation, or the circumstances which
cause the benefit to be supplied, are relevant, but only for
whatever bearing they may have on the actual satisfaction ob-
tained by the employee. If the value of the benefit to the
employee is known, it should be taxable.
2. Inclusion of On-the-Job Benefits in Income
Taxation of employees for compensation paid in cash or in
kind, or on the benefits from on-the-job entertainment does not,
of course, prevent the employer from deducting the cost as a
business expense. Certainly, a deduction should be allowed for
any expenditure designed to produce income despite the taxable
income incurred by a third person who gets personal satisfaction
from it. Recognition of the possibility, of the simultaneous exis-
tence of a business expense and personal satisfaction indicates
that, by concentrating on the situation of the self-employed
individual who is both the provider and the recipient of the
personal benefit, we have been asking the wrong question.
The business-benefit approach, allowing a full deduction to
All and Enough Business and Either Alone, and a partial deduc-
tion to Neither Alone and Sufficient Pleasure, is clearly correct.
Like the employer, the self-employed should get a deduction for
expenses incurred in business.38 But this does not entirely dis-
pose of the problem. All of these individuals but All Business
have also enjoyed personal satisfaction. If the description of the
ideal income tax outlined above is accepted, this consumption
should be taxable. If the same person who is entitled to the
business expense also enjoys the personal benefit, as is the case
with the six self-employed individuals, the personal income could
be recognized, in effect, by reducing the deductible expense
otherwise allowable.
The result would be the same as under the second suggested
approach, namely, that a business deduction would be allowed
only to the extent that an expenditure exceeds the personal
benefit enjoyed. 39 Thus, All Business is allowed a full deduction;
Enough Business and Neither Alone are permitted a partial
Thus, if this were the only dimension to the problem, it would not be upsetting
that by allowing a tax deduction the government pays approximately half the cost of
corporate entertainment-or even corporate lobbying or fines. After all, the government
gets one-half the income. See generally Cooper, The Tax Treatment of Business Grass Roots
Lobbying: Defining and Attaining the Public Policy Objectives, 68 COLUM. L REv. 801 (1968).
3 See W. POPKIN, THE DEDUCTION FOR BuSINEss ExPENSES AND Losses 17 (Harvard
International Tax Program Tax Technique Handbook 1973); Andrews, supra note 32, at
381; Klein, supra note 18, at 934 n.91.
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deduction; and Either Alone and the Pleasures are denied any
deduction. If the tax were based on consumption it would be
easy to include in the tax base the amount that each of the six
individuals would have been willing to spend to obtain personal
satisfaction. However, under an income tax, cash compensation
is taken into account when earned and should not be counted a
second time when it is used for tonsumption. Thus, when Solely
Pleasure goes to a football game for purely personal reasons his
tax picture is not affected because he buys the tickets with
tax-paid dollars. On the other hand, if a business deduction is
claimed, pre-tax dollars are used and, if the personal benefit
derived from the deducted amount is to be included in the tax
base, it must be specifically accounted for. This can easily be
done in the cases of All Business, Enough Business and Either
Alone. Since all of them place the business benefit of the football
tickets at the full cost of $25, they are initially entitled to a $25
deduction. For All, who is acting solely for business reasons, the
matter rests at that point. Either Alone placed a personal valua-
tion on the football tickets at an amount equal to full cost. Thus,
he has received income equal to the amount of the deduction.
The result is a wash and no deduction. Enough falls somewhere
in between. If, for example, he places a personal value on the
tickets equal to twenty percent of their cost, he should have
income in that amount, leaving a net deduction of 80 percent or
the excess of cost over consumption.
The explanation as to Neither Alone or Sufficient Pleasure
is a bit more complex. Since they value the business benefit at
less than full cost, they are entitled to a deduction for only a
portion of their expenditure. Assume that Sufficient believes that
the business potential would justify twenty percent of the cost of
the football tickets or $5. This amount should be deductible. The
personal value of the football tickets for Sufficient was $25.
However, of this amount only $5 came out of the business; the
rest was spent from personal tax-paid funds. The result is a $5
deduction and $5 in income, or a wash, and no deduction.
If Neither Alone would have spent $15 on the football
tickets for business purposes, he is initially entitled to a $15
deduction. Any personal satisfaction up to $10 is derived from
tax-paid dollars and need not be taken into account again.
However, if he would have spent $20 for personal purposes, $10
worth of pleasure is coming from the deducted amount and
should be taken into account by reducing the deduction to $5.
The result is a deduction for the excess ($5) of the amount spent
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($25) over the personal value attached to the expenditure ($20).
Thus, as stated above, this is the net deduction in all circum-
stances for the Businesses, the Alones and the Pleasures.
Recognition that denial of a deduction does not result from
a feeling that there has not been a legitimate expenditure for
business purposes, nor even from disallowance of the business
deduction, makes it easier to explain some otherwise trouble-
some results. This analysis would indicate that it would be
proper to deny a deduction for education essential to the job or
for entertainment which results in increased income, as long as
the personal satisfaction was also strong enough to justify the
cost.
Acceptance of this approach, however, should not cause one
immediately to draft a proposed amendment incorporating it
into the Internal Revenue Code. As has been noted, the items
under discussion are a problem precisely because it cannot be
assumed that the personal valuation attached to an expenditure
is equal to its market value. Each person's valuation is different;
it could be anywhere from zero up to one hundred percent of
market. The proposal advanced here, if literally applied, re-
quires knowledge of individual personal valuations which differ
from person to person and of which the individual himself
would not be aware in many cases. This is just not administra-
tively feasible. Therefore, the analygis represents only a goal to
guide the development of practical rules. Parts III and IV of this
Article will attempt to develop such rules.
F. Drawing the Line
It may be argued that the foregoing analysis suggests that
the personal satisfaction from the following aspects of one's work
should be taxable, as well:
1. Any personal valuation attached by an indi-
vidual to the physical nature of the job site. Thus, an
individual may very well prefer to work for $100 per
week in a factory which is air conditioned and which has
ood lighting, as opposed to a job for $110 a week in a
actory without these amenities. At a higher income
level, the executive's salary is undoubtedly affected by
the luxury of the office furnishings or the company car
made available to him.
2. Any personal valuation attached by an indi-
vidual to the income-producing activity itself, as op-
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posed to the intermediate activities designed to help in
the production of income which have been discussed.
For example:
(a) the theater critic who likes watching plays;
(b) the law teacher who likes teaching class;
(c) the lawyer who enjoys arguing cases.
3. The prestige and other psychic benefits derived
by an individual from a particular position.
If psychic benefits are as much consumption as entertain-
ment is, inability to tax the former may suggest to some that one
should not seek to tax the latter.40 One ground for this conclu-
sion would be a belief that the sum of the various kinds of
noncash benefits directly associated with a job is likely to be
proportionally distributed among all workers, making a tax on
cash roughly equivalent to a tax at a lower rate on the total
satisfaction. However, it seems more likely that prestige and
other psychic benefits would accompany higher-paying jobs that
provide other nontaxable fringe benefits as opposed to those
which yield compensation solely in cash.41 It may also be sug-
gested that the failure to tax some fringe benefits compensates in
some measure for the lack of a tax on leisure42 and for the
enormous favoritism of property income over earned income
which is a feature of our tax law. 43 It seems unreasonable to
make compensation to workers for the failure to tax leisure
depend upon the amount of in-kind benefits they receive. If
accommodation is necessary, it should be done more directly.
Again, those benefitting most from tax-free travel and enter-
tainment are likely to be the higher paid, who may also enjoy the
tax advantages- of capital gains or tax shelters. However, this may
be a reason to be less concerned with a loophole likely to benefit
the less well-off, such as the tax treatment of uniforms.
Thus, the proposal advanced in this Article, that the income
base should be expanded to include a greater amount of travel
and entertainment, can be adopted without deciding whether
40 "There is hardly more reason for imputing additional income to the [king's aide]
on account of his luxurious wardrobe than for bringing into account the prestige and
social distinction of a (German) university professor." H. SIMONS, supra note 7, at 53. See
Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S. 269, 279 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
41 Times may have changed. In 1938 Henry Simons wrote that "Compensation in
kind will ordinarily be small and confined largely to people at the bottom of the income
scale." H. SIMONS, supra note 7, at 124.
42 Simons suggested that exclusion of imputed income from services performed in
the household could be justified in part by the fact that leisure income is not included
within the tax base. The amount of services performed in the home would affect the
available leisure time. Id. 113.
43 See McNulty, supra note 25, at 17.
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further expansion of the tax base is desirable or feasible.
Nevertheless, for those who feel uncomfortable with this conclu-
sion, it may be useful to explore briefly whether any distinctions
can be drawn between travel and entertainment and the other
items described above.
An obvious distinction is that it may not be feasible to tax
some of these items. Unlike travel or entertainment, no one can
buy prestige or the right to argue a case independently of the job
in question. Thus, there is no objective market price to serve
even as the starting point in attempting to measure personal
satisfaction. In the absence of such easily ascertainable objective
valuation, not only is taxation not administratively feasible, but
also it is unlikely to obtain sufficiently widespread acceptance
among taxpayers. 44 For similar reasons, it is not possible to
include in income or consumption what the economist refers to
as consumer surplus.
45
However, people do pay to go to the World Series game
being covered by the local sportswriter, or to go to the theater on
opening night and sit in front of or behind the New York Times
drama critic. Thus, a market value can be found for these kinds
of benefits. Nevertheless, if it is accepted that the psychic pleas-
ure that comes from doing one's job cannot ordinarily be valued,
there is an inconsistency in having an exception simply because
one person's job involves an activity that comes close to being
something people pay to do. Again, it may be difficult to obtain
public acceptance of such a distinction.
The exclusion of psychic benefits from the tax base may also
be defended on the ground that the tax base should be confined
to economic goods, those which can only be enjoyed at the
expense of reduced enjoyment by others. There are limits on the
amount of goods and services our society can produce. On the
other hand, if a lawyer enjoys his court appearances or gets
along well with his wife and children, it has no effect on the
ability of others to do the same. Although one purpose of an
income tax is the more equal distribution of income, it cannot
transfer happiness. Similarly, if the purpose of an income tax is
to draw resources away from the private sector in favor of
government expenditures,46 it cannot deal with prestige, love or
friendship, which cannot be utilized to balance the budget.
44 Klein, supra note 17, at 884.4 5 See note 23 supra & accompanying text. Thus, if a loaf of bread costs 50W, it is
necessary to assume it brings 50€e of satisfaction to all who buy it, even though it is dear
that not all buyers value bread equally. The additional consumption of those persons who
would be willing to pay more than 5W is ignored by the law.
46See Andrews, supa note 32, at 325-26.
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Ultimately, this analysis is unsatisfying. Of course, the tax
cannot be collected in. the form of prestige or love, but this does
not explain why the cash to be collected cannot be determined by
applying the tax schedule to a base which would include these
items. A tax base comprised of total possible consumption would
insure that individuals with equal before-tax income would, after
tax, continue to have the same opportunity to achieve personal
satisfaction.47 After all, the tax cannot be collected in the form of
travel, meals, lodging or stock in the corporate employer either.
Moreover, it is not so easy to state that such items are disting-
uishable, because they are in-kind substitutes for what otherwise
would be purchased with cash. It may be that a lawyer who
enjoys his job, including the excitement of a day in court, will
also have less need to spend his money at night clubs or at the
movies. Nevertheless, it is not clear that the distinction between
travel and entertainment on the one hand and prestige or
enjoyment from the direct carrying on of one's work on the
other rests wholly on administrative convenience or on public
acceptance of the inclusion of such satisfaction in a tax base. In
fact, the feeling that the existence of prestige is of no help in
paying the tax appears to derive some support from what the
economist would refer to as the income effect on the demand for
goods and services which would be caused by a tax on such
prestige.48
To illustrate, suppose an attorney has a choice between law
practice with an income of $100,000 per year or a position as a
law professor with a salary of $30,000. Perhaps the teaching job
offers more leisure, more prestige and a captive audience several
times per week, all of which the attorney finds attractive. In a
tax-free world, he equates practice and teaching because he
values these noncash benefits at $70,000. 49 At first glance, a tax
uniformly applied to all forms of satisfaction would not seem to
affect this equation. But, if the tax on $100,000 of income were
471d. 326. Use of the income tax to redistribute income would be accomplished by
the progressive rate structure and exemptions appropriate to the degree of distribution
which is desirable or, perhaps, feasible.
48 The change in demand caused by a rise or fall in income would be referred to as
the "income effect" by economists. Not only does demand fall as income declines, but also
the ratio of income devoted to various goods may increase or decrease. A. ALCHIAN & W.
ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONOMics 73 (3d ed. 1972).
49 Moreover, because of the tax law the lawyer might well turn to teaching even
though he does not value these intangibles at $70,000. If after tax the law practice will
provide only $70,000, while the tax on a cash income of $30,000 is say $5,000, the two
positions are equally desirable if the intangibles are worth only $45,000, the after-tax
return on the additional $70,000 of cash. Thus, because such intangible benefits are not
taxed, the present income tax probably results in an increase in the number of teaching
jobs or a reduction in the cash salary necessary to attract teachers.
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$30,000, and if, as hypothesized, the teaching salary were just
$30,000, there would be insufficient cash available to pay the tax.
It would appear, therefore, that such a tax would drive the
attorney out of a teaching job.
On closer examination, it would seem that the problem
created by a tax on these psychic benefits is similar to the
difficulties that one would experience if the market value of
on-the-job entertainment were included in his taxable income
even though this amount exceeded his personal satisfaction. For
example, suppose a salesman received $30,000 in cash and his
employer spent $70,000 on his share of entertainment, an
amount far above the salesman's personal valuation. At first
glance, the professor's situation seems to be different, because it
was postulated that he values the psychic benefits at $70,000.
However, while this is correct if there is no income tax, or if such
benefits are not subject to tax, it is not true if the psychic benefits
are subject to tax. To put it another way, the salesman and the
professor might be satisfied with cash of $30,000 and noncash
benefits of $70,000 when there is no tax, or with after-tax cash
income of $25,000 and $70,000 of benefits in kind. But neither is
likely to want so much in kind when all their cash earnings are
consumed paying tax, and they are left with only in-
kind compensation.
Similarly, a theater critic's satisfaction from viewing a play
determined in a world without an income tax or at his current
level of cash income does not necessarily accurately measure
what his satisfaction would be if his cash income were reduced by
a tax imposed on the noncash benefits. The change in satisfac-
tion would be influenced by whether the noncash items are
necessities or luxuries and the significance of the reduction in
cash income, which in turn would depend upon the ratio of the
value of noncash amenities to total income from the job.
Thus, the difference between the value placed on an item in
a world without an income tax, as compared to a world in which
all satisfaction is taxed, may be particularly great with respect to
prestige and to the satisfaction from direct performance of the
income-producing activity-such as viewing the play, in the
critic's case.50 In addition to the reasons discussed above, the
' It is conceivable that unless the attorney can have a cash income of $25,000, he
would not place any value at all on the intangible benefits of the teaching profession. In
the circumstances where the lawyer values the noncash benefits at $70,000 when he has
cash of $30,000, and at zero when his cash income is reduced below $25,000, the
adoption of an income tax based upon full consumption would discourage teaching by
those who get significant psychic benefits from the job. The teaching job would certainly
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criteria, described in Part III, to be used in applying the theory
developed in this Part to the real world may suggest nontaxation
both of the critic's noncash remuneration, and of the satisfaction
from the physical nature of the job-site, which has yet to be
distinguished from travel and entertainment.5 '
III. APPLYING THE TEST IN THE REAL WORLD
A. Introduction
Since it is impossible to measure personal satisfaction on a
case-by-case basis, perfect measurement of net income cannot be
achieved. Either overstatement or understatement of income is
inevitable. Nevertheless, guidelines can be developed which will
indicate the possibility that a certain kind of expenditure will
yield personal satisfaction equal to cost, or no personal satisfac-
tion at all. If the guidelines indicate that the possibility of
personal satisfaction being equal to cost is a reasonable one, then
no deduction should be allowed or the recipient should be taxed.
Of course, there will be some such situations when personal
satisfaction will not in fact equal cost. However, as discussed
below, a strong case can be made that the consequences of a
failure to tax actual income are much worse than the conse-
quences which would result from the taxation of an overstated
income. Therefore, complete certainty is not necessary to justify
the assumption for tax purposes that the recipient of a benefit
would pay the market price for the benefit obtained. In short, a
reasonable possibility of the presence of income should be a
sufficient ground for taxation.
There will always be cases where the guidelines will not
point unambiguously in either direction. However, in situations
where the size of the questioned expenditure is relatively small
or, if large, is -spread out in fairly equal amounts to a large
proportion of taxpayers, whichever rule is adopted will not have
a pronounced effect on tax equity. The result in such cases
might properly depend upon considerations of administrative
convenience. This- approach would suggest, for example, the
denial of a deduction where the taxpayer makes an expenditure
require a higher salary to be attractive to those persons. However, the school, which
would try to keep the increase as small as possible, may hire someone deriving less
psychic benefit from teaching, who will work for $35,000 because this is only slightly less
than he could otherwise earn. The possibility of such results may make one feer more at
ease with the nontaxation of prestige and similar satisfactions.
51 See text accompanying note 65 infra.
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to benefit himself, while at the same time excluding from income
similar benefits provided by an employer to a large number of
employees. At least, such factors could be considered controlling
where the possibility of planning to take advantage of the lack of
symmetry is minimal.52 However, the question still remains as to
what is to be done in those cases where the guidelines are of little
help, and there is a large and relatively concentrated expendi-
ture where a great deal depends on the development of the
applicable rule.
Allocation of the deduction based upon the ratio of business
value to the total of the business and personal valuations has not
yet been specifically rejected as a possible procedure. However, if
the approach suggested in Part II is followed, allocation is logical
only if the total of the business and personal valuations is not
greater than cost. In any other situation, this method of alloca-
tion will permit some amount of consumption to be untaxed.
Nevertheless, as will be discussed in Part IV, Section E, relating
to travel expenditures, in some circumstances there may be no
choice but to attempt to develop a formula for allocation be-
tween the personal and business components. Travel expendi-
tures, for example, can be allocated based upon the total time
devoted to business as compared to the total time of the trip.
Comparative use is not always apparent, however. How, for
example, could the amount of time a college education is used
for business purposes be compared with its personal use? There-
fore, unless another measurement could be found, it would seem
that allocation would be totally arbitrary in many circumstances"
and that the use of this method should be kept to a minimum.
B. Developing Guidelines
Ultimately, guidelines should aid in resolving the issue
whether there is a reasonable possibility that an expenditure
52 It is understood that the Internal Revenue Service is Wvilling to wink at some
employer-supplied fringe benefits, e.g., parking spaces, at least as long as the amounts
involved are relatively minor. See HARVARD UNIVERSITY, INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM IN
TAXATION, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 538 (1963). It may not be so clear, however,
that everything which is ignored in this manner is minor. How many pay tax on the
significant personal benefit derived from being driven to work each morning in a
corporate or government car? It has also been implied that academics get significant
amounts of tax-free income from the use of university facilities. See Bittker, supra note 17,
at 953 n.46.
53 Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Fausner v. Commissioner, 413 U.S. 838
(1973), some courts were willing to allow a taxpayer who would have driven to work in
any event to deduct a portion of the commuting costs if the need to transport "tools"
would have required the use of a car. This kind of arbitrary allocation was derided by the
Fifth Circuit as random speculation. Fausner v. Commissioner, 472 F.2d 561 (5th Cir.
1973).
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yields personal satisfaction equal to cost. There are at least four
factors which should be considered in this connection:
1. The degree of certainty as to the business benefit to
be obtained.
2. The degree of certainty as to the existence of per-
sonal enjoyment.
3. The possibility of both business and personal satis-
faction from the same expenditure.
4. Payment by the individual benefitted or by another
party.5
4
1. Certainty of Business Connection
The existence of a clear business purpose for a transaction
makes it difficult to assert that "there must be a personal benefit,
since otherwise the transaction would not occur." In addition,
regardless of personal benefit, to the extent that the return in
terms of business benefit would not justify the expenditure, a
deduction should not be allowable. Indications that personal
satisfaction would not justify the full cost do not necessarily
indicate the existence of a business benefit. For example, even
Solely Pleasure would buy the $25 football tickets despite a
feeling they are worth only $12.50 from the personal standpoint,
if the cost were deductible and he were in a 50 percent tax
bracket. Although ordinarily the taxpayer's judgment is not
examined as to whether advertising or research, for example, is a
wise expenditure, in regard to personal benefit such questions
seem inevitable.
One method of assuring a reasonably strong business con-
nection is to require initially that the principal purpose of the
expenditure be for business. Hopefully, such purpose could be
established by objective criteria. 55 For a particular event, such as
a dinner in a restaurant or an evening at a night club, the law has
generally required a showing that business reasons are primary.
On the other hand, the cost of an asset, such as a home or a car,
allocable to business has generally been deductible despite the
fact that the asset was used primarily for personal purposes. The
general rule was modified in 1962 to deny a deduction for
depreciation or maintenance of facilities used for entertainment
unless the primary use of the facility was in connection with the
54 The application of these factors in evaluating the tax treatment of various items is
presented in Part IV, infra.
55 A stronger position would require proof that business reasons were clearly
sufficient to justify the transaction, as would be the case with All and Enough Business.
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taxpayer's trade or business. 56 Possible extension of this rule to a
home office should be considered. One objection to this ap-
proach is that certain activities, although engendering significant
personal enjoyment, would not occur but for some business
objective which might not be characterizable as the "primary"
purpose of the expenditure-the case of Neither Alone. It has
been argued in this Article that it is theoretically logical to allow a
partial deduction in such a case. Nevertheless, the practical
difficulties of calculating such a deduction are formidable.
Moreover, the theoretical inequity of not allowing a partial
deduction is somewhat ameliorated when one considers that in
most instances where a deduction was justifiable, the principal
purpose of the activity would be business. When the principal
purpose is not business, the theoretically ideal deduction would
be something less than half of the total expenditure, and thus
the harm resulting from disallowing the entire deduction would
be relatively small.
2. Certainty of Personal Benefit
As indicated, the introduction of a business motive makes it
impossible to be sure that personal satisfaction is as great as cost.
Not only might the taxpayer not otherwise engage in the activity,
but the business setting may diminish his personal satisfaction.
Nevertheless, in some circumstances there are grounds for rela-
tive certainty that personal satisfaction exists. Business enter-
tainment cannot. fulfill its intended function, unless someone
derives personal satisfaction from it. Food and clothing will
definitely be obtained in some form and, while it is conceivable
that no satisfaction will be obtained from the hundredth restaur-
ant dinner of the year, in most cases some personal benefit will
be produced. Similarly, although it is not possible to say that just
as everyone eats three meals a day, everyone goes to college, it is
true that for a segment of society a college education will be
sought just as universally and without regard to its effect on
future earnings.
In other cases, objective evidence of the existence of some
personal benefit may be available-the use of the extra room in
the house for personal reasons, or the extension of a business
trip to Europe to take a one week vacation. On the other hand, if
a businessman travels to a city not known for its attractiveness to
vacationers, there is an indication of the absence of personal
benefit.
3" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 274(a)(1)(B). See text accompanying notes 222-23 infra.
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Individual preferences for travel and other forms of enter-
tainment or recreation will vary, but, as described in Section C of
this Part, an individual's choice of jobs may give some indication
of the strength of his particular preference. Thus, the person
choosing a job with a significant entertainment component is
likely to be the one who values entertainment most highly.
3. Inconsistency of Business and Personal Enjoyment
In some situations, it will be impossible for the personal
satisfaction from an expenditure which is at least partly business
related to be equal to cost. This will be true, for example, where
there is a physical limitation on use of an asset, as in the case of
an automobile. If it is assumed that a car will last a relatively
fixed number of miles, and that there is no pleasure derived
from a business trip, then if it is driven 2,000 miles for business
purposes, that represents 2,000 fewer miles that it can be driven
for pleasure. Since ordinarily individual valuations are ignored
and it is assumed that a car is worth no more than its market
price, if the interference of business use is absolute, the sum of
personal and business benefit equals cost and no more. There-
fore, the relative value of each use can be measured by the time
the car is used for business as compared to pleasure. 57
On the other hand, there will be many instances where the
business aspects of a pleasurable activity will not necessarily
interfere with the personal benefit derived from it. Thus, the
total benefit from the expenditure could exceed the actual cost.58
This is true of the cost of the airline tickets for a combined
business-pleasure trip, if the traveler takes the additional time
57 It may be suggested that businessmen buy luxury cars to be used primarily for
pleasure, and thereby increase satisfaction, only because they can deduct the cost of the
business use. For example, a businessman may determine that the needs of his business
would justify spending $16,000 annually on an automobile while he would only spend
$8,000 for 'a pleasure vehicle. Since he has the $16,000 car anyway, he uses it half the
time for pleasure. Even assuming he does not overstate his business use, he still has the
advantage of driving a $16,000 car with a nondeductible outlay of only the $8,000 he was
willing to spend on a pleasure vehicle. Surely his satisfaction must increase. However, if
the car were used solely for pleasure, it would last longer and he would get more use out
of his $8,000. He now may be spending $8,000 per year while a pure pleasure car would
last for two years. At $8,000 per year he could have bought the $16,000 car totally apart
from the business use. If there appears to be something wrong with the logic of this
example, it may be that a car does not have within it a relatively fixed number of miles.
To a man who will buy a new car eachi year anyway, the business use might not detract
from the personal pleasure from the car. The option of a $16,000 car every two years was
not a real one.
S8 It may be argued that this position, that total benefit could exceed cost, is
inconsistent with the failure to take account of consumer surplus in measuring taxable
income. But measurement of individual preferences in order to determine a total
valuation in excess of market is not required. What is involved is the assumption that a
taxpayer can simultaneously value a benefit at cost in his identity as a businessman and in
his identity as a consumer.
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necessary to make his business call, and if having business on his
mind does not detract from his vacation. Presumably, a move to
Miami because of the climate and because of a job opportunity
can be carried out by the same moving truck and in the same
airplane, without one aim interfering with the other. If a man
gets a certain personal satisfaction from wearing a suit, he could
possibly get the same benefit from wearing a suit to the office
unless suit-wearing benefits depend greatly on the surroundings
in which the suit is worn. While it does seem possible.that one
who does not need to work may get more personal use out of a
liberal education than one who does, the personal benefit of a
college education is probably not significantly affected by its
usefulness in obtaining a job. The interference with personal
satisfaction from the business use of a room in the home, or
from entertainment or meals that occur in a business context,
would seem to fall between the extremes of relatively absolute
interference in the case of the automobile, and the minimal
interference involved in travel and education. In any event, as
the degree of interference declines, it will be more probable that
the personal benefit will be equal to one hundred percent of the
cost, and that a deduction will not be justified.
4. Identity of the Payor
The fact that the individual is not the payor may be some
indication of his lack of personal benefit, because in such circum-
stances he may have less control over the selection of the activity
involved. 59 Thus, in some marginal cases, employer or third
party payment may justify nontaxation of the benefit. However,
it should not have much of an effect as to meals, lodging, travel,
entertainment and the other items discussed in this Article. With
regard to these items lack of complete control would have less
effect on the likelihood of receiving significant personal benefit.
Therefore, in many circumstances travel and entertainment
paid for by an employer, client or supplier and received by
employees or customers should result in taxable income.60 Such
a proposal, however, involves certain problems. Presumably
59See Treas. Reg. § 1.274-4(f)(5)(i) (1963).
60 If one's dinner is purchased by a friend, it is exempt from tax as a gift. Irrr. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 102. Although there is not likely to be an intention of making a gift
to a customer, the regulations imply that a gift is possible at least as to tickets of admission
if the seller does not accompany the customer to the event. Treas. Reg. §
1.274-2(b)(1)(iii)(b)(2) (1963). This does not interfere significantly with the proposal to be
advanced, since the Code limits the deduction for gifts to individuals to $25 per donee
per year. I,'T. REV. CODE Or 1954, § 274(b).
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there will be cases where it will be difficult for an employer to
allocate its costs to particular employees. More significantly, it is
at least unwise to attempt to tax the customer when a salesman
takes him to dinner. Certainly it would be an undue interference
with business to require notification to the customer of the
amount spent to entertain him.
These are not insoluble problems. In many cases, total tax
collections that would result from inclusion of such benefits in
income could be approximated by a rule denying a deduction for
particular expenditures unless the payor designated the
beneficiaries. This could be accomplished by filing an informa-
tion return with the Internal Revenue Service and sending a
copy to the beneficiary. If the beneficiary received such an
information return, he would be taxable; otherwise not.
For example, assume the Widget Corporation of America
spent $100 entertaining Smith, a potential buyer of widgets. If
the corporation could deduct the expenditure, its out-of-pocket
cost at a forty-eight percent tax rate would be $52. If Smith were
taxed at a fifty percent rate, the Internal Revenue Service would
get $50 from Smith, who would have a net benefit of $50. If the
expenditure were not deductible by Widget because it was not
reported as taxable to Smith, then the Service would collect an
additional $48 from the corporation. In these circumstances, the
corporation would be out $100 and Smith would be $100 ahead,
but this increase in the corporation's costs presumably would be
reflected in the price of widgets or in other transactions between
the corporation and Smith.
A similar approach is reflected in the current exemption
from the special limitations on entertainment expenditures of
"expenses for goods, services, and facilities, to the extent that
expenses are treated by the taxpayer, with respect to the re-
cipient.. . as compensation to an employee. ' 61 If this rule would
take hold, the suggestion made earlier6 2 that small employer-
supplied benefits should, in the interest of convenience, not be
taxed is unnecessary. It would be possible to deny a deduction to
the employer, unless income is allocated to particular individuals.
Differences between employer and employee tax rates may
cause a distortion in some circumstances. However, if the fifty
percent maximum tax on earned income63 becomes generally
61 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 274(e)(3).
"'Note 52 supra & accompanying text.
13 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1348. For a description of the circumstances in which
the limitation would not apply, see Halperin, Maximum Tax Not for Those Indulging in
Deferred Compensation and Tax Preferences, 24 MAJOR TAx PLANNING 619 (1972).
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applicable, individual rates will not ordinarily be significantly
higher than the tax rate on corporations, thus minimizing the
distortion. Therefore, in light of the administrative difficulties of
taxing the recipient, it is acceptable to leave the choice of who
pays the tax to the parties. The most serious problem would
involve expenditures by government or tax-exempt organiza-
tions, which would not lose a deduction as the price ofproviding
tax-free enjoyment to others. It would not seem impossible
generally to impose a tax on the beneficiaries in these cases.
64
5. Application of the Guidelines
The guidelines may offer support for the nontaxation of
benefits derived from direct performance of the job (like the
critic's) or from the physical nature of the job site (like office
furnishings), although the conclusion as to the latter is more
questionable.
a. Direct Performance of the Job
Testing for a sufficient business connection, the necessity of
the critic attending the play or the trial lawyer appearing in court
is obvious. The personal satisfaction may also be less than one
would expect in the case of a critic or a sportswriter who is
working at his job while at the entertainment event. The lawyer,
entertaining an out-of-town client, may be able to sit back and
enjoy the play as much as the person in the next seat who is
there with his spouse. The critic must think constantly of his
review, and he is not able to choose which plays he will see and
review.
Since the critic is paid to watch the play, it may be argued
that his enjoyment is not seriously affected by these difficulties.
But it seems impossible to determine case by case whether the
job interferes with watching the event. For example, consider the
situation of a producer, cameraman, statistician and announcer
all working on a TV football broadcast. It may be better to
assume that all suffer reduced enjoyment.
Moreover, few if any people go to as many sports events as a
sportswriter whose entire job consists of reporting such events. A
salesman entertains customers as only part of his selling efforts
and often outside his normal working hours. True, the
sportswriter or the theater critic is likely to be the person who
6 4 
Cf. CARTER REPORT, supra note 41, at 288-89 (suggesting penalty tax on employers
which could also be applied to tax-exempt institutions).
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most enjoys sports or the theater. Still, when entertainment is the
stuff of which the entire job is made, there is less reason to feel
confident that personal satisfaction will equal cost-especially
when the effects of the reduced after-tax income from taxation
of all benefits is considered.
6 5
b. Job Facilities
With regard to the business use of a luxury car, while there
is no assurance that the use of a Cadillac makes it likely one will
make more money than he would if customers were visited in a
Chevrolet, there is evidence that at least part of the cost has a
business purpose. This is not necessarily known in the case of a
visit to a night club or a cruise on a yacht.
In measuring personal satisfaction, the proper question may-
be how much would have been paid for the ride in the Cadillac,
the air conditioning in the factory, the first class airplane ticket
or the paintings on the office wall, assuming there was no
business need to be on the plane or in the car, the factory or the
office. It is not unlikely that the answer will be nothing, at least as
to the air conditioning and the automobile ride. For one thing,
the personal and business use must be simultaneous. Being
forced to drive where customers are located or to be at work in a
factory probably significantly diminishes the personal satisfaction
from the car and the air conditioning. Furthermore, the em-
ployee may have air conditioning available at home which is
being used in any event for the comfort of his wife and children,
so that the job provides only duplicative benefits. Similarly, if he
were not working, he might be able to keep cool without cost by
sitting in the park, or substitute for the comfort of a Cadillac by
lying down on the living room couch.
Nevertheless, this analysis is too simple in that it looks to the
choice between working and not working. The fact remains that,
given the necessity of working, the businessman chose to make
$97,000 a year and to use a Cadillac for business trips, as
opposed to making $100,000 and using a Chevrolet. Is not the
real income in both cases $100,000? On the other hand, is it
helpful to say that the purchase of the Cadillac represents an
incomplete acceptance of the choice of work over leisure, not
markedly different from working fewer hours, making only
$97,000 and enjoying $3,000 more in leisure instead of in cars?
Although there does not seem to be a completely satisfying
65 See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
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answer, there appears to be justification for taxation of luxury
facilities where administratively feasible.
For example, it seems clear that no deduction should be
allowed for the cost of food .in excess of a relatively modest
amount per day. While it is possible that a person would prefer a
simpler meal with his family and would pay nothing to eat in a
restaurant, it appears more reasonable to assume that at least
some of the extra cost of a high-priced restaurant meal provides
personal satisfaction. Perhaps this conclusion is influenced by the
feeling that there is a personal benefit equal to the entire cost of
the food. Since no deduction is justified, one can hardly object to
only a partial disallowance. However, it also seems reasonable to
place a dollar limit on the deduction for out-of-town lodging
even if the hotel room is in a city which would obviously not be
visited for personal reasons. Perhaps again this is influenced by
an assumption that the percentage of cases where the individual
would pay full value for the hotel room, even in the absence of
business considerations, is greater than it would be for the use of
a car or a luxurious office. Nevertheless, this is not a wholly
satisfying distinction. For example, this exercise in line drawing
may put first class air fare on the side of hotel rooms rather than
automobiles. The need for an easily administerable rule may
suggest that it is impossible to place a dollar limit on the cost of
office furnishings, but this would not preclude a maximum
deductible cost per mile for a car used for business, or a limit on
the deduction for air travel to the cost of a coach ticket. Such a
limit should be considered.
C. Procedure in Uncertainty
Nontaxation of real income in the form of goods and
services enjoyed in connection with work is unfair to taxpayers
who do not enjoy such income, and it distorts economic activity
by causing overutilization of these items. If an individual values a
form of entertainment at $2,000, he will obviously prefer $3,000
in cash which he can spend as he likes. However, if the cash is
taxed at a rate of forty or fifty percent, then the untaxed
entertainment becomes more valuable. There would thus be a
tendency to increase the untaxed component of one's income
over the amount that would be expected in an income-tax-free
world.
This practice increases the unhappiness of those whose work
does not permit arrangements for tax-free consumption. The
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realization that his tax load is increased due to the failure of
those who can say "it's deductible" to pay their fair share has an
effect on the morale of the ordinary taxpayer.66 Ultimately our
self-assessment system depends on a high level of taxpayer
morale.
On the other hand, if goods and services enjoyed on the job
were assumed for tax purposes to be worth their market price, it
would be unfair to those individuals whose personal satisfaction
was significantly less. The chances for tax equity would be
greater if the bias were in this direction, however, since in many
circumstances it is reasonable to expect personal benefit equal to
cost. If this is not the case, the affected individuals might be able
to reduce their usage of the overtaxed items, thus bringing
taxable income more in line with personal enjoyment. They
certainly would no longer have an incentive to overindulge. For
these reasons and because of the concern for taxpayer morale, it
would be better to assume that goods and services are worth the
market price to the individual as long as there is a reasonable
possibility that this is true.
Acceptance of this position requires consideration of
whether reduction in the use of the goods and services, most
significantly entertainment, which would in some circumstances
be overvalued under the proposal advanced in this Article would
involve an unwise interference with economic behavior. Al-
though the discussion which follows is undoubtedly over-
simplified, it is hoped that it gives a fair indication of the
relevant questions.
1. Effect on Behavior-In General
Even in a tax-free world, there is a bias in favor of activity
which will serve the dual purpose of producing income and
providing personal satisfaction. All other things being equal,
education would be favored over other methods of increasing
income, because it has the by-product of personal benefit. Simi-
larly, if a $100 expenditure on either advertising or entertain-
ment is likely to produce $200 of income, but the entertainment
expenditure also provides $50 of personal satisfaction to an
employee or a customer, entertainment will be preferred since it
will enable the employer to lower the cash compensation to the
employee or raise the price to the customer.
" Hearinp, supra note 8, at 1687 (testimony of leading accountant); S. REP., supra
note 10, at 407, 1962-3 Cv.%i. BULL. 1110 (minority views of Senators Douglas and Gore);
Bittker, supra note 17, at 953; 3 CARTER REPORT, supra note 41, at 43.
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This process should insure that if anyone values the enter-
tainment component of a job at its market price, that person will
get the job. For example, suppose there are two individuals, alike
in abilities but with different tastes for entertainment, who are
applicants for a job requiring its holder to entertain customers at
night clubs 100 times during the year. Assume that the cost to
the employer of the employee's share of the entertainment is
$3,000 annually. Swinger, who enjoys night clubs, would accept
the job at $15,000 per year, but Holmes, who obtains no per-
sonal satisfaction from a night on the town, would insist on
$18,000. Since Swinger and Holmes are assumed to be equally
good salesmen, Swinger, who will work for less money, will get
the job. Holmes will look for a position paying $18,000 in cash. 67
But suppose that, perhaps because the amount of enter-
tainment required by the job is so great, no individual can be
found who personally values the entertainment at its full market
price. For example, suppose Swinger is required to go to a night
club 200 times per year at a cost to his employer of $6,000, but
neither Swinger nor anyone else would pay more than $3,000
for the privilege.
The burden of a tax measured by the cost of entertainment
could fall on Swinger if he is unable to secure another job. If
Swinger has a number of job opportunities, the employer will
have to raise Swinger's cash income above $15,000 to compen-
sate for the overtaxation of entertainment, unless he can reduce
the entertainment content of the job to a point where the cost
will not exceed Swinger's personal satisfaction of $3,000. Either
course could in effect result in a price increase. Thus, if the
employer pays Swinger a higher salary, he may be able to pass on
the cost to customers. Similarly, if entertainment is a means of
effecting a rebate in price to customers or their employees, any
67 The existence of'an income tax would have no effect on the result if Swinger's
personal satisfaction of $3,000 were properly measured. If the consumption benefit in
the form of entertainment were not taxed, presumably Swinger would be willing to
accept less than $15,000 in cash as long as the total of the cash left after tax and the
$3,000 of in-kind benefits is not less than the net after-tax income from $18,000 of cash
compensation. This would further insure that the compensation would be driven too low
to make it acceptable to someone like Holmes, who gets no personal satisfaction from the
entertainment. Failure to tax by lowering the cost to the employer without reducing the
employee's compensation would also have the effect of increasing the utilization of
entertainment. This is part of the economic distortion that comes from failure to tax
certain forms of compensation.
Personal taste for entertainment may not be a determinant of job selection if the
benefit is not an important enough component of the job for persons in that labor market
properly to take cognizance of it. For example, entertainment might not be a sufficient
element of an attorney's work to affect anyone's decision to become a lawyer. In those
circumstances the cost of such benefits would probably not be great, and the conse-
quences of an overevaluation of them should not be serious.
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reduction in Swinger's entertaining is an indirect increase in
price.
If Swinger bore the burden, there would be a decline in his
income and an inequity in the application of the tax since he
would be taxed on more than he actually received; but there
would be no change in the use of entertainment. In some
circumstances, however, placing the burden on the employer
would affect such usage.68
For example, assume Swinger can earn $18,000 in another
job. The salary he would demand from a job providing enter-
tainment would depend upon his tax bracket and the personal
enjoyment derived. If Swinger were in the 50 percent bracket
and valued the entertainment at $3,000, the tax measured by the
$6,000 cost of the entertainment would offset the personal
satisfaction obtained. Thus, he would insist upon cash compensa-
tion of $18,000.
If the amount spent entertaining customers was as produc-
tive of income as alternative means of doing business, it would
not be necessary for the employer to change his method of
operation. The bias in favor of activities providing personal
satisfaction is eliminated, but entertainment remains as viable as
other business expenditures. Both now require a salary of
$18,000. But suppose $6,000 spent on entertainment produced
only $9,000 of gross income, while $6,000 spent in other ways
would increase gross income by $12,000. If the entertainment
benefit were not taxed, or were taxed but accurately measured,
the outlay would be justified since it would permit the employer
to hire Swinger at $15,000 per year rather than Holmes at
$18,000. Thus the return in effect is $12,000 on entertainment
as well. If Swinger's taxable income is increased by $6,000 as a
result of the entertainment, however, he will insist on a salary of
$18,000 and the entertainment will no longer be economical.
Nevertheless, as long as the tax on the value of entertain-
ment does not exceed the personal satisfaction obtained by the
employee, an employer, even one who bore the full burden of
the extra tax on entertainment, could consider and utilize enter-
tainment as any other expenditure of producing income. If
personal satisfaction obtained from entertainment equalled at
least half the cost, and the maximum tax on earned income were
50 percent 69 the tax could not exceed the personal benefit. Thus,
" The analysis would be identical for a self-employed individual who could avoid the
excess tax burden only if he could pass it on to customers.
69 See note 63 supra. It is reasonable to assert that those whose use of tax preferences
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it is reasonable to believe that valuing entertainment at cost
would cause a reduction in its use only in those cases where it is
presently used purely because it enables the employer to pay
lower salaries than his employees would otherwise command.
To summarize, if it seems possible that some people can
derive enjoyment equal to the market price of job-related ac-
tivities, it is reasonable to assume that such persons are the ones
likely to take the job. Even if it seems unlikely that any one
would value the benefit so highly, if it is reasonable to assume a
personal benefit equal to at least one-half of the cost, entertain-
ment will still be as useful as other forms of doing business,
despite a tax on the employee based upon market value. Al-
though if there is over-valuation there will be some decline in the
use of entertainment compared to its use in an income-tax-free
world, this distortion is much less serious than the overutilization
that accompanies a failure to tax actual satisfaction.
In fact, it is possible that a decline in entertainment would
increase efficiency. The use of entertainment implies an attempt
to sell products by making the buyer like the seller, or more
probably by offering the buyer or its employees a price rebate in
the form of entertainment. Since not everyone values entertain-
ment at cost, a direct price reduction would be more efficient. It
may be that an increased tax burden on entertainment would
force marginal companies which have no alternative means of
selling their goods out of business. But this would not be harm-
ful if it encourages the growth of other firms that sell on a more
rational basis. Therefore, it is concluded that the possibility of
interference with economic behavior is not serious enough to
override the tax equity considerations which suggest that there
should be a bias toward taxation in excess of personal satisfac-
tion, as opposed to a failure to tax such satisfaction.
2. More About Critics
The conclusion may be different if the entertainment con-
cerned is directly involved in performing a job, as is the case with
a theater critic or a sportswriter. In these circumstances, the
alternative of reducing the entertainment component of the job
is not available. A salesman can still sell if he entertains less, but a
theater critic must go to plays in order to review them. The only
possible adjustments if the personal satisfaction from on-the-job
benefits is overestimated, are higher salaries for critics or elimi-
prevents them from taking advantage of the 50% maximum rate are not worthy of
concern.
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nation of the job. This seems potentially more disruptive than
the effect on the salesman.
Thus, one might want more assurance that the critic receives
satisfaction equal to market cost before imposing a tax on that
basis. As previously discussed, despite the self selection which
would cause those who most enjoy the theater to become critics,
there is not adequate assurance that the benefit is ever this
great.70
IV. EVALUATION OF PRESENT LAW
In this Part, present law is examined to see if the rationale
implicit in the existing rules can be determined. Such rationale as
can be found will then be examined in light of the previous
analysis. Necessarily, the statement of existing law will have to be
brief, and some omissions are unavoidable.
A. Education
1. The Law
Since 1958, educational expenses have been deductible if the
education maintains or improves skills which are required by the
individual in his trade or business, or is required by the
taxpayer's employer or by law as a condition of continued
employment. 71 In order to qualify, a taxpayer must have already
attained at least the minimum educational qualifications for his
job, and must show that the education would not qualify him for
a new trade or business.7 2 These two restrictions make-it difficult
to deduct the cost of any education which leads to a degree, with
the exception of some -graduate education in the same field as a
prior degree.
73
Before 1950, even this parsimonious approach would have
seemed revolutionary, as the IRS and the courts, adopting what
"See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
71 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1958). At an earlier time a deduction was allowed only if the
education was required by the employer. I.T. 4044, 1951-1 CUM. BULL. 16; Proposed
Treas. Reg. 1.162-5(d), 21 Fed. Reg. 5093 (1956). See Wolfman, Expense, supra note 16, at
1102 n.63. Since the employer-requirement test is not met unless the "requirements are
imposed for a bona fide business purpose of the individual's employer," Treas. Reg. §
1.162-5(c)(2) (1967), it may be difficult to meet this condition without also satisfying the
first test.
72Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b) (1967).
7 3 See Rev. Rul. 69-199, 1969-1 Cum. BULL. 51. But see John D. Glasgow, 31 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 310 (1972), aff'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir. 1973) (Baptist
minister allowed to deduct the cost of a B.A. degree). Although the case was decaded
under the 1958 regulations, the court found that the taxpayer's bachelor degree did not
qualify him for a new trade or business.
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they took to be Justice Cardozo's dictum in Welch v. Helvering,74
held that educational expenses are personal and denied all
deductions. Nora Payne Hill75 provided the breakthrough, as the
Fourth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's conclusion that the
summer school expenses of an experienced teacher were per-
sonal, finding them both "ordinary" (normal incident for
teacher) and "necessary" (required for continued certification).76
According to the regulations, the fact that an individual is
performing a job does not establish that he has met the
minimum educational requirements.77 Thus, the cost of a bar
review course is not deductible, even if one attends at night while
working for a law firm during the day. 78 But a teacher need only
show that he has attained the level of education normally re-
quired for initial hiring as set by law or custom. This is so even
though all teachers might be required to obtain additional educa-
tion, such as a master's degree, within a relatively short period of
time.7 9 College instructors who need a Ph.D. for permanent
affiliation, however, would apparently generally not be able to
take advantage of this more liberal rule to deduct the cost of
their graduate education. 80
Since 1967, the regulations have denied a deduction to
anyone who qualifies for a new trade or business regardless of
his motivation for seeking more education.8' Prior to that time,
the taxpayer's primary purpose was crucial.82 This change has
74 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). For an argument that Justice Cardozo was misinter-
preted and was using the term "ordinary" only to distinguish between current and capital
expenditures, and not between personal and business expenses, see Wolfman, Expense,
supra note 16, at 1095-97.
7- Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950), rev'g 13 T.C. 291 (1949).
76 181 F.2d at 909.
7" Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2)(i) (1967). See, e.g., Lonnie R. Lenderman, 22 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 511 (1963).
78 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2)(iii) example (3) (1967).79 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2)(ii), (iii) (1967).
8"Id. & example (2); Arthur M. Jungreis, 55 T.C. 581 (1970). InJungreis, the court
denied a deduction to a teaching assistant, finding inter alia that a Ph.D. was the minimal
educational requirement for the job he sought. Some persons at the instructor level may
be more successful, since under the regulations the deduction may be allowed if the
doctoral candidate is a member of the faculty and thus has met the standard for initial
hiring. This may depend upon whether his service is counted toward obtaining tenure or
upon whether he has a vote in faculty affairs. Under the previously applicable principal
purpose test, see text accompanying note 82 infra, some taxpayers succeeded in deducting.
the cost of a Ph.D. upon a showing that their main concern was retention of their current
position. See, e.g., Marlor v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1958), rev'g per curiam
27 T.C. 624 (1956) (opinion relies on Judge Raum's dissent in the Tax Court).
81 T.D. 6918, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 36, amending Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1958). The Tax
Court has indicated its approval of the Commissioner's effort to avoid investigation of
subjective intent on a case-by-case basis. David N. Bodley, 56 T.C. 1357, 1361 (1971). See
also Connelly v. Commissioner, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9188 (1st Cir. 1971) (per curiam);
Wolfman, Education, supra note 16, at 546.
82 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1958).
DEDUCTIBILITY OF PERSONAL EXPENSES
not affected educators very much since all "teaching and related
duties," apparently including the duties of a school adminis-
trator, are now considered part of the same trade or business.8 3
Similarly, a psychiatrist studying to be an analyst is acknowl-
edged to be advancing within the same profession.8 4 On the
other hand, the new approach has led to the denial of a deduc-
tion for the cost of legal education for revenue agents,
5
accountants8 6 and claim adjusters8 7 who claimed they sought
only to improve their skills in their present trades.
The IRS now grudgingly agrees that one who has temporar-
ily ceased to work in order to go to school full time could be
taking courses to maintain or improve skills in an existing trade
or business, as long as the layoff does not exceed one year.88
Taxpayers out of their respective businesses or trades for longer
periods have been unsuccessful in their claim of a deduction.8 9
2. Analysis
In sum, the regulations allow a deduction for education
which maintains or improves skills required by the individual in
his trade or business, and which are not part of the minimum
educational requirement for the business or part of a course of
study leading to qualification in a new trade or business.
It seems true that once the taxpayer has a particular job,
there is a more objective measure of the business purpose of the
expenditure. For example, music lessons for a concert artist are
more clearly business related than piano lessons for the mul-
titude who play for their own personal enjoyment. This could
support a rule which would deny a deduction for education
unless the individual has established himself in a particular
business. Thus, the Internal Revenue Code requires that the
taxpayer be "carrying on" a trade or business.90 The minimum
requirement test might be a necessary adjunct to such a rule, in
83 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3) (1967).
84 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(ii) example (4) (1967). See Greenberg v. Commissioner,
367 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1966), rev'g 45 T.C. 480 (1965).
8 5 Jeffry L. Weiler, 54 T.C. 398 (1970). Cf., e.g., William J. Brennan, 22 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1222 (1963) (expenses allowed under prior regulations).
"'See Charles W. Berry,'30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 465 (1971) (deduction allowed under
pre-1967 regulations based upon experienced accountant's subjective intent but no
deduction would have been allowed had the current regulations applied).
87 Compare Robert J. Connelly, Jr., 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 376, affd per curiam, 72-1
U.S. Tax Cas. 9188 (1st Cir. 1971), with Richard M. Baum, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 206
(1964) (decided under prior rules).
81 Rev. Rul. 68-591, 1968-2 Cum. BULL. 73. See Furner v. Commissioner, 393 F.2d
292 (7th Cir. 1968), rev'g 47 T.C. 165 (1966).
8 'See, e.g., Don E. Wyatt, 56 T.C. 517 (1971).
91 Iwr. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 162. See text accompanyin- notes 117-18 infra.
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order to avoid different results for similar expenditures depend-
ing on when an individual obtains a job. For example, one law
student might begin part-time work for a law firm during his
third year in law, school while another does not find work until
after he passes the bar. It may be unfair for the former to get a
deduction for the last year's tuition while the latter does not. 91
This consideration does not apply once an individual has met the
minimum standard once, which might suggest, for example, that
it is incorrect to deny a deduction for the cost of preparing for a
second bar examination, particularly since a teacher can deduct
an expenditure for courses necessary to qualify in a second
state.
9 2
Similarly, qualification for a new trade or business may be
held to preclude deduction for fear of discriminating between
those who, for example, enter law directly and others who might
first engage in some generally related field. This would suggest
that the regulations correctly consider the position of school
principal to be a continuation of the teaching profession, because
being principal is a position which ordinarily can be attained only
by first becoming a teacher.
Thus, present rules could be explained as being designed to
allow deductions even-handedly under circumstances where
there is assurance that all those who qualify are actually engaged
in the trade or business to which the education relates. But is it
necessary to insist upon this condition to be certain that the
educational costs are business expenditures? It seems fairly obvi-
ous that a good deal of education before one actually begins
business can be justified as a business expense on the ground
that it will substantially increase the student's earning capacity.
93
91See Arthur M. Jungreis, 55 T.C. 581, 591 (1970). Cf. James A. Carroll, 51 T.C.
213, 216 (1968).
9' Rev. Rul. 71-58, 1971-1 Cur. BuLL. 55. The regulations also allow a deduction to a
mathematics instructor who takes courses to qualify as a science teacher. Treas. Reg. §
1.162-5(b)(3)(i)(b) (1967). However, the Tax Court has denied a deduction to a foreign
lawyer, Yaroslaw Horodysky, 54 T.C. 490 (1970), and a foreign dentist, Ansis Mitrevics,
22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 271 (1963), on the grounds that they needed the education to
meet minimum requirements for practice in the United States, despite previous practice
in Europe. Surprisingly, however, the only reason advanced for denying a deduction for
the cost of a second bar admission (including in one case the cost of a bar review course)
to American lawyers was that the expenditure was capital and not ordinary. Arthur E.
.Ryman, Jr., 51 T.C. 799 (1969); Larry R. Adamson, 1973 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 473 (1973).
There was no discussion in either case of the possibility of amortization.
" For a review of the economic literature attempting to establish the rate of return
on investment in education, see McNulty, supra note 25, at 43-49. Professor McNulty
concludes that, despite the theoretical and empirical difficulties of such research, "a
review of the economic literature leaves a residual conviction . . . that education does
contribute to higher income." Id. 45. For an opinion that while "education leads to large
and statistically significant differences in earnings, these differences . . . are relatively
small in comparison with those arising from the conglomeration of family background,
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In fact, the principal purpose of much education-law school,
medical school, engineering or a cram course in preparation for
a CPA exam-may be business rather than personal.
It is interesting that the IRS does not really deny this. The
regulations state that the cost of education which is a prerequisite
for obtaining the current position, or which qualifies the indi-
vidual for another trade or business, represents an "inseparable
aggregate of personal and capital expenditures,' 94 and is thus
not an ordinary and necessary business expense. This could be
taken as an admission that some portion of such expenditures
are business related and should, like the cost of a building, be
amortized over the period of usefulness (perhaps to age
sixty-five or over the period of like expectancy),95 but it does not
appear that the Treasury has conceded that point.96 Instead, the
Service could be suggesting that for education expenses to be
deductible, the cost must exceed the personal benefit, and that
all education prior to qualifying for a job has or is likely to have
some personal benefit. Since the amount of this personal benefit
cannot be established in a particular case, being "inseparable"
from the capital expenditure, it follows that the amount of the
business expense cannot be determined.9 7 and no deduction is
justified.
3. Evaluation
The question of a tax deduction for the cost of higher
education is an enormously complex subject, involving not only
the effort to perfect the definition of income with which this
Article is concerned, but also such matters as the extent to which
education should be subsidized, the effects of a tax allowance on
the allocation of educational resources, and the redistribution of
income or educational opportunity. This has been exhaustively
studied elsewhere, 98 and it would be presumptuous to do more
than offer a few tentative conclusions here.
attitudes and nonpecuniary preferences and are no larger than the differences due to
ability," see, Taubman, Personal Characteristics and the Distribution of Earnings (to be
published).
9" Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(i) (1967). This language, adopted in 1967, represents a
change from the previous statement that disallowed expenses were personal. See Wolf-
man, Education, supra note 16, at 546.
"Cf. Rev. Rul. 70-171, 1970-1 Cuss. BuLL. 55 (fee paid by a physician for nontrans-
ferable lifetime privilege to use a hospital's facilities can be amortized over physician's life
expectancy).
"m See note 16 supra.
97The Service may also be suggesting that amortization is not allowable because a
useful life cannot be established. Id.
" McNulty, supra note 25, passim.
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In general, there is little to criticize in present law. As to the
deductions which are allowed, the likelihood of personal benefit
from these expenditures is small enough to be reasonably
overlooked. 99 On the other side, since the personal benefit of
education does not significantly conflict with its business use, it is
possible for the personal value to equal the expense of educa-
tion. The personal benefits at least through college seem fairly
strong. If personal satisfaction is equal to cost, even the assump-
tion of a large return on investment does not justify the deduc-
tion. Moreover, the strict position of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice is consistent with the proposition advanced here that doubt
should be resolved by denying a deduction. Certainly, any in-
creased tax burden caused by doing so will fall most heavily on
relatively high-income persons.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that all nondeductible
educational expenses have enough of a personal element to
justify the Treasury's approach. It is hard to find any personal
satisfaction in a bar review course or in a course for preparation
for the CPA exam. 100 It would also seem that the personal
content in vocational, paraprofessional, professional and perhaps
other postgraduate education is minimal.' 0 ' It is also arguable
that certain undergraduate courses, such as those in engineering
or business, are primarily career related.
A distinction between types of undergraduate courses, how-
ever, would create insurmountable administrative problems.
10 2
Moreover, at least among some groups, a college education may
have become such a necessity for future personal relationships
that it may be reasonably safe to assume that these technical
courses are mere replacements for a liberal arts degree. Perhaps
for the student they do not have as high a personal value as a
major in an area like English would, but it is probably necessary
to ignore this distinction. It is doubtful that there would be a
large amount of error if it were assumed that all academic
99But see Keith W. Shaw, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 626 (1969). The case holds that
flying expenses of an FAA medical examiner, including cost of a refresher course, were
deductible because they maintained or improved skills needed in determining whether
pilots were medically able. The court suggested that it would have been immaterial that
the taxpayer's principal purpose might be personal enjoyment. Id. at 631.
1But see Rev. Rul. 69-292, 1969-1 Cum. BULL. 84.
101 See McNulty, supra note 25, at 18. Professor McNulty suggests that there is a
personal benefit from this education, although presumably less than the amount obtained
from an undergraduate program. The "purely personal delights of legal instruction"
would include "the elevated social status of the legal profession, . . . bettered marital
opportunities.... daily classroom entertainment [and] generally sharpened intellectual
powers."
102 Wolfman, Education, supra note 16, at 548.
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education through college has a personal satisfaction equal to
cost. It is very unlikely that the same could be said for a
professional or other postgraduate course.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to allow a deduction (amor-
tized over a working career) for the cost of postgraduate work
and post-high-school vocational training.' 1 3 If one feels that
some education of this type is significantly or even primarily for
personal satisfaction, somewhat greater protection against abuse
could be achieved by limiting any writeoff to earned income, or
more strictly to the total income from the profession to which the
education is ostensibly related.' 
1 4
B. Job-seeking and Other Preparatory Expenses
1. The Law
Deductions have been denied for the cost of seeking out job
opportunities, because the expenses were not related to the
"carrying on" of the taxpayer's current trade or business but
rather were intended to put the individual in a position to do the
job. 05 Thus, campaign expenses in seeking election or re-
election to office are not deductible,' 0 6 but the cost of opposing a
recall petition is.'
0 7
In an apparent exception to this rule, the Internal Revenue
Service has always allowed a deduction for employment agency
fees payment of which is contingent upon the agency placing the
taxpayer in a job.'0 8 The Service originally denied a deduction
103 For views consistent with those expressed in the text, although apparently more
receptive to a deduction for the cost of undergraduate college education, see McNulty,
supra note 25, at 27-30, 31-32, 36; Wolfman, Education, supra note 16, at 548-50.
14 See McNulty, supra note 25, at 30-31; Wolfman, Education, supra note 16, at 549.
1'5The quote is from INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162. See generally Wilberding, An
Individual's Business Investigation Expenses: An Argument Supporting Deductibility, 26 TAX
LAw. 219 (1973). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(0 (1957).
106 McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57 (1944); Vernon v. Commissioner, 286
F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1961), affg Ernest H. Vernon, 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 851 (1959)
(union election). Cases like David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374 (1970), see note 111 infra, make
it difficult to affirm the rule in McDonald on the ground that the expenses are not related
to being an official, at least if it is a reelection campaign. The courts may continue to
reach the same result on grounds of public policy, which was an alternative holding in
McDonald. See James B. Carey, 56 T.C. 477 (1971), affd per curiam, 460 F.2d 1259 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972); Horace E. Nichols, 60 T.C. 236 (1973). Since
public office is sought for reasons other than the salary, campaign expenses may also be
considered personal. In fact, the amount spent may often be wel beyond what would be
justified by the expected monetary return.
17 Rev. Rul. 71-470, 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 121.
108 O.D. 579, 3 Cum. BULL. 130 (1920) (allows deduction for "fees paid to secure
employment"), revoked, Rev. Rul. 60-158, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 140, reinstated, Rev. Rev.
60-223, 1960-1 Cums. BULL. 57 (allows deductions for fees paid "for securing employ-
ment"). See David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374, 380 (1970).
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for fees payable regardless of the agency's success, but this
distinction has recently been withering away in a series of cases
involving fees to Frederick Chusid & Co. and similar agencies.
Chusid offers a service to executives which includes an evalua-
tion of the client's background, abilities, personality and oppor-
tunities, and assistance in developing material which will sell the
client to prospective employers.
In DavidJ. Primuth,10 9 the Tax Court permitted a deduction
of the cost of the Chusid Agency's fee despite the fact that
payment of the fee was not contingent on the securing of new
employment. In cases like Prinuth in which the taxpayer in fact
secures a new job, the Internal Revenue Service has acquiesced
in the result,110 but the Tax Court goes further and allows a
deduction for fee-payers who do not find new jobs, thus reject-
ing the Service's distinction between seeking and securing
employment. 1 '
The court's focus now seems to be on whether the job being
sought can be related to a trade or business in which the
taxpayer is currently engaged. Some earlier cases had defined
the taxpayer's trade or business quite narrowly in terms of
employment with a particular company,'12 but more recently the
Tax Court has created categories of greater breadth, such as
administrator or executive." 3 This change in approach has not
completely solved the problem, however. For example, an Air
Force officer facing retirement was denied a deduction, because
the job he was seeking was not related to the business of being an
Air Force officer. The court failed to consider whether the new
job would have utilized similar skills." 14 In addition, there may
still be a requirement that the taxpayer remain employed while
looking for the new job, even if the job he seeks is in a field in
109 54 T.C. 374 (1970).
110 Rev. Rul. 71-308, 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 167 (distinguishes "seeking" from "secur-
ing" employment and makes clear that costs incurred while simply seeking employment,
without securing it, are not deductible).
11 Leonard C. Black, 60 T.C. 108, 113 (1973). The court stated: "It is now a settled
proposition of law in this Court that expenses incurred in either seeking or securing new
employment within the taxpayer's established field are deductible."
Following Primuth, the court first allowed a deduction when a new job was found
even though it was not accepted, Kenneth R. Kenfield, 54 T.C. 1197 (1970); then when
the taxpayer failed to find a job, Leonard F. Cremona, 58 T.C. 219 (1972); and even
though the taxpayer voluntarily terminated his relationship with the agency before it
completed its efforts, Roy E. Blewitt, Jr., 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1225 (1972).
112 See, e.g., Thomas W. Ryan, 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 580, 582 (1959).
'13 Leonard F. Cremona, 58 T.C. 219, 222 (1972) (administrator); David J. Primuth,
54 T.C. 374, 377 (1970) (corporate executive).
114 Eugene A. Carter. 51 T.C. 932 (1969). See Leonard F. Cremona, 58 T.C. 219, 221
(1972).
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which he previously worked.'15 Finally, with the exception of the
revenue ruling allowing contingent employment agency fees to
be deducted, there does not seem to be any support for a
deduction for taxpayers who enter an entirely new business or
profession. Thus, bar examination fees and other costs of admis-
sion to the bar continue to be nondeductible.
16
2. Analysis
The courts have been able to justify the disallowance of job
seeking and other preparatory costs by pointing out that at the
time the expenses were incurred, the taxpayer was not yet
"carrying on" a trade or business as required by section 162 of
the Internal Revenue Code. This may be an acceptable distinc-
tion between current and capital expenditures," 7 but it is
difficult to see how it converts a business-related expenditure
into a personal expense."18 As is true with education, this rather
technical approach can be supported only if one believes that it is
not practicable to determine the business purpose of an expendi-
ture in the absence of a current activity to which the expense can
be related.
The apparent discrepancy with respect to contingent agency
fees may be explained by the Tax Court decision in Cecil Ran-
dolph Hundley, Jr.119 Hundley, a major league catcher, was al-
lowed a deduction for an amount paid to his father for creating
the publicity and other circumstances which enabled Hundley to
secure a bonus for signing a baseball contract. The court held
that although Hundley was not in a trade or business when the
services were performed, he was in a trade or business when the
obligation became fixed, because liability depended upon the
signing of a baseball contract. If this explanation is valid, it seems
difficult to deny a deduction for the cost of admission to the bar
(but not examination fees) which is payable only when the
examination is passed, since at the time the obligation to pay
"5 Miller v. United States, 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9681 (E.D. Tenn., Aug. 14, 1973);
James Davis Protiva, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1318, 1321 (1970). But See Gale Carlisle
Huber, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 958, 960 (1970); David J. Primuth, 54'T.C. 374, 378
(1970); Harold Haft, 40 T.C. 2 (1963), acquiescing in result, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 2
(unemployed salesman allowed cost of continuing to make contacts with former custom-
ers while seeking similar employment).
"'Treas. Reg. § 1:212-1(f) (1957).
11 7 See Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.), rev'd on
other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965).1 t 8 Wolfman, Expense, supra note 16, at 1112.
119 48 T.C. 339 (1967), acquiesced in, 1967-2 Cum. BULL. 2.
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becomes fixed, the taxpayer will effectively have been accepted
into the legal profession.
3. Evaluation
The decisions in this area seem overly restrictive in view of
the minimal risk of personal satisfaction from these expendi-
tures. If an individual claims that a trip to Las Vegas was for the
purpose of looking for a job as a manager of a hotel, one is
justifiably suspicious, even if the individual is now a manager of a
hotel at an eastern resort. But the personal element in a news-
paper advertisement or in a payment to the Chusid agency while
seeking new employment is much harder to find. 120 It could only
exist if the change in position was sought in order to permit a
move to a more pleasant city rather than to further the
taxpayer's career. This possibility should not result in disallow-
ance when no change of residence is involhed. Moreover, the
statutory treatment of .moving expenses suggests acceptance of
the notion that most job changes are caused by a desire for
advancement in one's business. -12 1 Since the business benefit is
relatively clear, while the possibility of deriving personal satisfac-
tion from job-seeking costs not involving travel or education is so
slight, these expenditures should either be deducted currently or
amortized over the individual's working life.
C. Clothing and Uniforms
1. The Law
The current policy of the IRS with regard to uniforms and
work clothing is still that set forth in 1950, when two conditions
were established for deductibility: the clothing must be required
as a condition of employment, and it must not be adaptable to
ordinary wear.
1 22
At an earlier time, the IRS had held that the cost of
uniforms was personal, because uniforms merely replace ordi-
nary clothing. 23 A break in this position came in the late thirties
when jockeys' 2 4 and baseball players125 were permitted deduc-
120 See David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374, 379, 381 (1970).
12' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 217; see text accompanying notes 171-75 infra.
112 Mimeo 6463, 1950-1 CuM. BULL. 29, superseded, Rev. Rul. 70-474, 1970-2 CuM.
BULL. 35.
123 I.T. 1488, 1-2 CuM. BULL. 145 (1922).
124 G.C.M. 19662, 1938-1 CuM. BULL. 118,superseded, Rev. Rul. 70-475, 1970-2 CuM.
BULL. 35.
125 G.C.M. 19790, 1938-1 CuM. BULL. 118-19, superseded, Rev. Rul. 70-476, 1970-2
CUM. BULL. 35.
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tions. The rationale for this change eventually led to the issuance
of the IRS' current position in 1950.126
The condition that no deduction be permitted -for clothing
which is suitable for off-the-job wear, or even for clothing which
is not if the employer does not require it to be used, has been
strictly enforced. Thus, a plastics worker confined to a wheel-
chair was denied deductions for a protective apron that was not
employer required, and heavy work pants that were suitable for
ordinary wear.127 Regular military personnel are not permitted
to deduct the cost of their uniforms on the ground that they
merely take the place of articles required in civilian life.1 28 The
Treasury apparently assumed this clothing could be worn after
hours, because it allows a deduction to reservists who can only
wear uniforms while on duty. 29 Whether clothing is actually
worn outide of work is ordinarily immaterial. Thus, a California
driving examiner was not allowed a deduction for the cost of his
required grey suit because it was suitable for ordinary wear,
despite the fact that it never was so used.130 However, it has been
possible in some cases to establish that clothing is unsuitable for
ordinary wear either because of the possibility of spreading
disease encountered in the course of work,' 3 ' or because custom
and usage forbid off-duty use.
132
Actors have been treated more leniently. For example, Ozzie
Nelson was permitted to deduct the cost of clothing worn on the
TV show Ozzie and Harriet, despite the fact that what he wore was
not noticeably different from what people wear generally.' 33 The
other notable exception is Betsy Lusk Yeomans, 134 who was permit-
ted to deduct a small portion of the cost of the high fashion
clothing required by her job as a fashion coordinator.
" See also Rev. Rul. 59-219, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 46-47.12
7James Donnelly, 28 T.C. 1278 (1957), affd, 262 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1959). On
appeal, Judge Hand in dissent objected to the use of the "employer requirement" test to
deny a deduction for the apron. His position would sanction a deduction for any item
unsuitable for ordinary wear which protects regular clothing while at work. 262 F.2d at
413. See also Rev. Rul. 57-143, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 89 (painter's whites not deductible).
128 Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(8) (1958).
1
2 9 Id. See also Rev. Rul. 67-115, 1967-1 Cum. BULL. 30.
"8 Harry J. Sanner, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 476 (1969). But see Robert C. Fryer, 33
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 122 (1974) (shoes worn by airline pilot).
131 Oliver W. Bryant, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 430 (1952).
132 Rev. Rul. 67-115, 1967-1 Cum. BULL. 30 (military fatigue uniforms); Helen
Krusko Harsaghy, 2 T.C. 484, 486 (1953), acquiesced in, 1945 CUM. BULL. 3.
"I Oswald G. Nelson, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1142 (1966). See also Charles Hutchi-
son, 13 B.T.A. 1187 (1928), acquiesced in, VIII-1 Cum. BULL. 22 (1929) (movie stuntman's
clothing costs deductible due to heavy wear and tear).
134 30 T.C. 757 (1958), acquiesced in, 1959-1 CUm. BULL. 5.
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2. Analysis
It is often assumed that people who work spend more on
clothes than those who do not.' 5 The suit the new lawyer wears
to the office will cost more than the blue jeans he wore to class in
law school. Yet, with the exception of uniforms and other
equipment required by the employer which cannot be used off
the job, no deduction is allowed.
Clothing and food, as essentials of life, are different from
education, entertainment or travel. In the absence of business
reasons it is easily conceivable that the last three items will not be
purchased, but people will eat or wear clothes, regardless of
whether they work. The clothes one wears to work may not be
identical to what one would wear at leisure, but they are at least
in part a substitute for leisure clothes. The fact that similar
clothes can be, and probably are, worn off the job indicates that
there is personal satisfaction from on-the-job wear. Moreover,
one cannot assume that what an individual otherwise would have
spent on clothes is an accurate measure of the value he attaches
to the clothes he wears to work. Since this is true, it is probably
correct to assume that the personal valuation is at least as great
as the cost. Thus, altlhough the employed person is spending
more on clothes, he is also enjoying it more. This supports
current law, which classifies most clothing costs as nondeductible
personal expenditures.
The assumption is, however, unfair to anyone who attaches
a personal valuation to on-the-job clothing which is less than the
market price. For example, assume that over a given period
Enough Business would spend $20 on the clothing worn during
the daytime period when most people are at work. Upon being
employed, Enough needs to spend $50 for work clothes for the
same period. If perfect information as to value were available,
the difference between $50 and the personal satisfaction Enough
attaches to these clothes should be a deductible business expense.
Enough's personal satisfaction is not necessarily the $20 he
would otherwise spend. It could be more than $20, if Enough
would have been willing to spend more, say $30, in order to buy
these clothes, although he did not value them at the $50 market
price. In other words, even in the absence of the job, Enough
would have been willing to transfer $10 of his consumption from
movies to clothes, if these particular clothes were available at
$30. On the other hand, Enough's personal satisfaction may be
" See R. GOODE, supra note 25, at 81.
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less than the $20 he would otherwise spend, if he feels uncom-
fortable in the work clothes. 136 An assumption of zero satisfac-
tion would explain the rule relating to uniforms.
3. Evaluation
There are strong reasons for assuming that the personal
satisfaction derived from clothing worn at work is equal to cost.
Clothes, of course, must be worn whether or not the individual is
working. If one is able to wear what one likes, there is not likely
to be a significant decrease in satisfaction from the clothes
because of the surroundings in which they are worn.
If work clothes wear out more quickly because of the nature
of the work, or otherwise cost more, there is a justification for a
deduction. The personal satisfaction from wearing a new pair of
overalls each week can hardly be much greater than that which is
derived from a single pair which lasts three months. The fact
that their clothes could be worn only briefly may explain the
relative leniency towards actors.' 3 7 Moreover, there are indica-
tions that the possibility that some uniforms are more expensive
than regular clothing may have influenced the allowance of
deductions.' 38 Nevertheless, neither excessive cost nor lack of
durability seems to be a unique characteristic of uniforms, if they
are indeed strong features at all.
A more likely explanation for the treatment of uniforms is
that because they are not normally worn, one is less sure about
personal satisfaction. Clearly, a space suit furnished, to an as-
tronaut does not produce personal benefits equal to its cost. But
the rule seems too liberal in many cases. A policeman may feel
just as good in a uniform as he would off duty in a suit.
Certainly, it is not illogical to assume that he might value the
uniform at least as much as the amount he is saving on the cost
of civilian clothing.
Nevertheless, while a rule limiting a deduction to items
which do not replace other clothing and to uniforms which are
significantly more expensive than the civilian clothes replaced is
logically more defensible, not enough is gained from this
refinement to justify the extra administrative burden. This may
be particularly true since most people who wear uniforms are
136 Suppose that a young attorney hates wearing suits and ties so much that he would
not pay even a penny to get them for personal use. In such circumstances, even though
he may save $20 on the cost of jeans it does not seem possible to say that he has $20 of
consumption from wearing suits.137 See cases cited note 133 supra.
138 See Marcus 0. Benson, 2 T.C. 12 (1943), affd, 146 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1944).
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relatively low paid and may not be getting psychic benefits or
other nontaxable fringe benefits from their jobs. In general,
present law is acceptable.
D. The Office in the Home
1. The Law
Self-employed professionals have apparently never had any
difficulty in obtaining deductions for the use of space in the
home as an office. Thus, the regulations have stated since 1918
that:
A taxpayer who rents a property for residential pur-
poses, but incidentally conducts business there (his place
of business being elsewhere) shall not deduct any part
of the rent. If, however, he uses part of the house as his
place of business, such portion of the rent and other
similar expenses as is properly attributable to such place
of business is deductible as a business expense.'
3 9
The IRS and the courts have not insisted that part of the house
be set aside exclusively for business. For example, in Imero 0.
Fiorentino140 the court permitted a TV lighting designer to de-
duct twenty percent of the cost of a four room apartment,
because he used various parts of the apartment for business.
Employees have had a much more difficult time, as the IRS
has insisted upon proof that the use of the home was specifically
required by the employer. 41 This condition has been gradually
eroded. The early taxpayer successes mostly involved teachers
who were able to deduct for an office in the home upon a
showing of the nonexistence, inadequacy or inconvenience of
employer supplied work space.' 42 More recent decisions have
dispensed with the requirement of strict necessity and have
allowed a deduction when the use of a home office by the
employee was appropriate and helpful, regardless of the fact
that it may also have been convenient.1 43
"'Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(3) (1958). Nearly identical language, except that it
referred specifically to "professionals," appeared in T.D. 2831, 21 TREAs. DEC. INT. REV.
170, 240 (1918) (Reg. 45, § 291).
'"" 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1445 (1970).
141 Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 52.
M Rev. Rul. 64-272, 1964-2 CUM. BULL. 55; Clarence Peiss, 40 T.C. 78 (1963),
acquiesced in, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 2.
143 See, e.g., LeRoy W. Gillis 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 429 (1973); Marvin L. Dietrich,
30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 685 (1971); George H. Newi, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 686 (1969),
aff'd, 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970).
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The liberality of the Internal Revenue Service in agreeing to
deductibility for the self-employed has been offset by its strict-
ness in computing the amount of the deduction in circumstances
where space is not exclusively set aside for business. Once the
applicable cost of the relevant portion of the house is deter-
mined, the Service asserts that the amount deductible should
depend upon the percentage of business use as compared to
total hours in the day.14 4 Taxpayers, on the other hand, have
claimed that the denominator of the fraction should be only the
total amount of actual use. This was recently accepted by the Tax
Court in George W. Gino.14
5
2. Analysis
The current approach to a deduction for an office in the
home seems designed to allow a deduction whenever there is a
business justification for the expenditure. This could explain the
IRS attempt in the case of employees working in the home, to
apply a stricter definition of "necessary" than the usual test, i.e.,
whether an expenditure is appropriate and helpful. 146 Since
there may be personal reasons for securing the space which is
claimed to be a home office, the Service is seeking more assur-
ance that the business benefit is'worth the cost.' 47 One sympath-
izes with the Treasury, but it must be noted that a similar
uncertainty as to business benefit exists with respect to the
self-employed or even where the employer requires a home
office. 148
There may also be an implicit assumption that the total
personal and business valuation which can be placed on a par-
ticular room is no greater than the rent or other applicable costs.
'4Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 GUM. BULL. 52, 56-57. This position was approved in
Hoggard v. United States, 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9741 (E.D. Va. 1967); Martha E.
Henderson, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 109 (1968).
14r 60 T.C. 304, 314-15 (1973).
'"See Wolfman, Expense, supra note 16, at 1105.
"'See Robert Lee Henry, 36 T.C. 879, 884 (1961); Wolfman, Expense, supra note 16,
at 1107. The IRS maintains a similar position with respect to clothing used on the job,
and previously insisted that education could be deducted only if required by the
employer. See text accompanying notes 122-27 supra (clothing); note 71 supra (education).
See generally INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 119(2) (allowing exclusion from income of the
value of lodging where "the employee is required to accept such lodging as a
condition of his employment"); Lee, supra note 6. The Tax Court, in rejecting the
Internal Revenue Service's position relative to the home office, has suggested that the
.requirement of the employer" test has been rejected in other areas, including clothing.
Marvin L. Dietrich, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 685, 686-87 (1971).
148 In other circumstances, the IRS has disavowed any intent to discriminate against
employees as compared to the self-employed. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(d) (1958); Wolfman,
Expenses, supra note 16, at 1101-03.
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Therefore, as is the case with an automobile, the division be-
tween personal and business values can be determined on the
basis of relative use.
149
3. Evaluation
There should be a deduction for office space in the home
where a particular room is used exclusively, or nearly so, for
business purposes; but where space is used partly for business
and partly for personal purposes, the present approach under-
states taxable income. It is surprising, in light of the very real
doubt as to the business benefit, that it is not required that the
principal purpose of the room be for business. Also being
ignored is the real possibility that despite business use, the
personal satisfaction from the room may not be less than cost.
Although the potential conflict between business and personal
use can be greater with a room in the house than it is with
clothing or education, it is doubtful that the conflict is as great as
it is with an automobile, so as to justify unquestioning adoption
of the same approach.
Thus it seems unlikely that many people would assert the
right to deduct ten percent of the basic telephone charge because
ten percent of their monthly calls were business related.' 50 This
is correct, because they probably would have had the phone
installed in any event, and the personal valuation of the phone
service is at least equal to the basic charge despite the interfer-
ence of the business calls. Nevertheless, many people deduct part
of the cost of their living quarters even though their house is the
same size as it would be in the absence of an office in the
home. 51 How many of these people could say that while the
house would provide personal satisfaction equal to cost in the
absence of the office, it now falls short because the existence of
the office diminishes the personal use? Is it not possible that
there are people who get full value from both the business and
the personal use of the room, or at least that the dual use adds to
the value of the room so that personal satisfaction is not di-
minished by the full amount of business benefit?
The IRS method, limiting the deduction to that percentage
of the cost of the space which reflects the ratio of business use of
the space to its total availability, could be supported if one
"'4 See text accompanying note 57 supra.
' 'But see Martha E. Henderson, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 109, 112-13 (1968).
"' See Stephen A. Bodzin, CCH TAX CT. REP. No. 32,115 at 2933 (1973) (Feathers-
ton, J., dissenting).
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assumed the acquisition of the space was justified personally, but
the personal satisfaction was reduced because during a certain
number of hours the room was unavailable for nonbusiness
purposes. This approach is too generous if the business use
(weekday evening) does not interfere at all with the personal use
(guest room for weekends), but may be too restrictive if, for
example, the placing of the furniture interferes with personal
use. However, it seems a reasonable compromise.
In sum, where the principal purpose of acquiring the space
in question is personal, a deduction should be denied. Although
comparative use is not an absolute measure of whether business
or pleasure is more important, it is close enough to warrant
taking advantage of the availability of an objective test. Where
the primary use is business, a deduction should be permitted,
preferably applying the ratio of actual business use to total
availability. This may be hard to support when personal use is
not substantial. After all, if business use is exclusive, a full
deduction is allowed even though the room is not used
twenty-four hours a day. Should there be such a dramatic
change when there is' one percent personal use? Nevertheless,
because the business benefit may be doubtful and the personal
satisfaction seems so strong, it would probably be justifiable, on
account of the view that it is better to err on the side of
disallowance-to adopt the IRS rule-at least whenever the per-
sonal use is significant. In fact, for the same reason total disal-
lowance is probably appropriate whenever personal use is
significant.
E. Travel Fares
1. The Law
This section will focus solely on the costs of transportation;
meals and lodging will be discussed separately. A taxpayer's right
to a deduction for fares depends upon the business reason for
the trip. Stricter rules apply to travel as a form of education and
to travel to seek out new job opportunities. It is also more
difficult to get a deduction if the trip takes the taxpayer outside
the United States.
a. In General
If a trip is exclusively for business, travel fare is a deductible
expense. 152 If while at a destination a taxpayer
152 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(a) (1958).
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engages in both business and personal activities, travel-
ing expenses to and from such destination are deducti-
ble only if the trip is related primariily to the taxpayer's
trade or business. If the trip is primarily personal in
nature, the traveling expenses to and from the destina-
tion are not deductible even though the taxpayer en-
gages in business activities while at such destination. 153
The regulations state that the primary purpose of a trip is to be
determined from all the facts and circumstances, but that the
amount of time spent on business as compared to personal
matters is an important factor to be taken into account.
154
b. Education and Travel
Travel primarily to take a course is deductible if the educa-
tion involved is the kind for which a deduction is allowed.
155
Primary purpose is determined in the manner just described for
business travel generally. Travel will also be deductible as a form
of education in itself, if the taxpayer can show that the major
portion of his activities during a period of travel is of a nature
"which directly maintains or improves skills required by the
individual" in his business.' 56 Most of the taxpayers who have
sought to take advantage of this opportunity have been teachers.
Although many have been unsuccessful, 5 7 others have per-
suaded the judge that the travel expenses contributed to the
enhancement of the taxpayer's teaching skills.
1 58
c. Change of Jobs
The Internal Revenue Service has held that an individual
does not obtain income from an all-expense-paid trip to visit a
prospective employer.' 59 Conversely, the Service considers the
'Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b)(1) (1958).
'5 4 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b)(2) (1958).
"' Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(e) (1967).
"' Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(d) (1967). This rule is made subject to the provisions of
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(e), which requires that the primary purpose of the trip be business.
However, since the 1967 amendments to this regulation, T.D. 6918, 1967-1 Cuss. BULL.
36, 39-40, the courts have stated that the subjective test (motive for the trip) is no longer
applicable to travel as education. See, e.g., Krist v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 1345, 1348 (2d
Cir. 1973); Stanley Marlin, 54 T.C. 560. 565 (1970), acquiesced in, 1970-2 Cus. BuLL. xx.
The Tax Court suggests that the objective test (allocation of time) is more liberal than the
previously applicable subjective test, but this need not be true if a taxpayer can establish
his primary motive was business related despite the fact that he spent more time on fun.
"' See, e.g., Krist v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir. 1973); George W. Gino,
60 T.C. 304 (1973); James L. Denison, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1074 (1971).
M See, e.g., Paul R. Dougherty, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 186 (1970): Gladys M. Smith,
26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1281 (1967); Helen V. Oehlike, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 663
(1967).
"11 Rev. Rul. 63-77, 1963-1 Cuss. BULL. 177.
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cost of a trip in search of employment or to investigate a business
or an investment opportunity nondeductible. 160 Nevertheless,
once a taxpayer has proceeded beyond mere investigation and
has taken concrete steps to develop an investment opportunity, a
loss will be deductible even though the transaction is never
consummated. 16 1 Moreover, in light of the recent liberalization
in the area of employment agency fees, 16 2 prior holdings may no
longer be applicable to the extent a deduction has been denied
on the theory that travel to seek new employment in the same
field is not related to a current trade or business.
Closely akin to travel to another city in search of a job
opportunity is the expense of moving once ajob is obtained. The
law is more liberal in this regard, however, as section 217 now
allows the direct costs of moving family and furniture to be
deducted. 63 It also permits a limited deduction for the cost of a
trip for the principal purpose of searching for a new
residence. 64 But, consistent with the job-seeking cases, the cost
of a trip to seek a new residence is not deductible unless it is
initiated after a job has been found.
d. Foreign Travel
Since 1962, under section 274(c) of the Code, there have
been further restrictions on deductions for foreign travel when
the trip lasts more than one week and when the individual
spends twenty-five percent or more of the trip's time engaged in
nonbusiness activity outside of the United States. 6  A portion of
the fare is disallowed corresponding to the percentage that the
number of nonbusiness days bears to the total days spent on the
trip. 66 A day is deemed entirely a business day, even though
only spent partially on business, if the principal activity during
160 Morton Frank, 20 T.C. 511 (1953); Rev. Rul. 70.396, 1970-2 CuM. BULL. 68. Cf.
Rev. Rul. 57-418, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 143.
161 Theodore R. Price, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1405-3 (1971); Harris W. Seed, 52
T.C. 880, 887 (1969), acquiesced in, 1970-2 CuM. BULL. xxi; Rev. Rul. 71-191, 1971-1 CuM.
BULL. 77.
16'See text accompanying notes 109-11 supra.
163 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 217(b)(1)(A), (B).
164I&, § 217(b)(1)(C). The Code sets a $1,000 maximum on the total of such
expenses and the sum spent on meals and lodging while occupying temporary living
quarters at the new job location. It also establishes an overall $2,500 limit for the total of
expenditures subject to the $1,000 limit plus the amounts spent to sell or buy a home or
to acqure or terminate a lease. Id. § 217(b)(3)(A).
'IsId. § 274(c)(2). Section 274(c), which is derived from President Kennedy's 1961
recommendations, Hearings, supra note 8, at 283-84, originally applied to all travel but it
was restricted to foreign travel by the Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat.
19, 56.
166Treas. Reg. § 1.274-4(f)(1) (1964).
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business hours was the pursuit of a trade or business. Even if this
condition is not met, it is still a business day if the taxpayer can
show that his presence outside the United States was required on
that day for a specific and bona fide business purpose, such as a
particular meeting.
1 67
However, the entire foreign travel expense will be allowed if
the taxpayer can show that he did not have substantial control
over arranging the trip, or that obtaining a vacation was not a
major consideration in making the trip. 168 Apparently, any em-
ployee who is not a ten percent shareholder will not be considered
to have substantial control over a trip paid for by the employer,
unless he "is authorized, without effective veto procedures, to
decide upon the necessity for his business trip . . -"169
2. Analysis
Present law focuses on the business benefit to be derived
from a trip, allowing a deduction whenever such benefit is shown
by the fact that the trip's principal purpose was business. Only in
the case of travel as education do the regulations explicitly
require that a major portion of the time be spent on business,
although they do indicate that time spent will always be an
"important" factor in determining principal purpose.
An exception to this approach is the reluctance to allow the
cost of traveling to seek new employment to be deducted, re-
gardless of whether there is a personal reason for the trip. As
previously discussed, this may be explained by the fear that it will
not be possible to discern the existence or absence of the business
benefit when there is no current activity to which the trip
relates.1 7 0 But if a prospective employer is willing to pay for the
trip, this could establish a business purpose sufficient to justify
the exclusion that is allowed.
In contrast to the restrictions on job-seeking costs, moving
expenses receive liberal treatment. The Internal Revenue Code
allows moving expenses to be deducted with only minimal con-
sideration of the primary purpose of the move.1 7' The individual
must work full time in the new location for at least thirty-nine
167 Treas. Reg. § 1.274-4(d)(2)(ii), (iii) (1964).
' Treas. Reg. § 1.274-4(f)(5) (1964).
169 Treas. Reg. § 1.274-4(f)(5)(i)(a) (1964).
170See text accompanying notes 90, 117-18 supra.
17
1 
See R. GOODE, supra note 25, at 79-80. Presumably, there is a willingness to assume
that most job changes are career motivated and are not due to a personal desire to live in
a different location.
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weeks during the year following the move,"7 2 which makes it
more difficult to deduct the cost of a move to a place selected as
a retirement home. The requirement that the new job be fifty
miles farther from the old home than the prior job 7 3 helps
assure that the move is connected with a job change. 74
Nevertheless, there is little assurance that the job change did not
occur because the taxpayer and his family preferred living in the
new location. In fact, the move can take place even before a new
job is found. Prior to 1962, no deduction was allowed in any
circumstance. Exclusion from income of employer-paid moving
costs was permitted only when the employer's willingness to pay
and the absence of a change in employers tended to establish
that the move was for the employer's purpose and not to en-
hance personal satisfaction.
1 7 5
The allocation rules of the 1962 Revenue Act17 6 treat travel
costs similarly to the expense of an automobile in that it is
assumed that total benefit cannot exceed cost, and that a good
indication of the relative business and personal satisfactions is
the time spent on each.
3. Evaluation
The guidelines presented in Part III are conflicting indi-
cators as to the proper treatment of travel expenses. Since one
can go to a destination, complete one's business, and then enjoy a
vacation without any business interference, it seems more likely
than with almost any other type of expenditure considered in
this Article (except perhaps education) that the personal benefit
from travel could be worth the full cost. On the other hand,
unlike wearing clothing or eating, travel may be forgone in the
absence of business considerations. Moreover, compared to en-
tertainment, for example, there will be many more cases where
travel will not provide any personal benefit at all. Certainly, some
travel expense must be deductible.
172 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 217(c)(2). For the self-employed the requirement is 78
weeks in the 2 years following the move.173 1d. § 217(c)(1)(A).
174 For an example where this would not be so, see Treas. Reg. § 1.217-2(a)(3)(i)
(1972).
175 Rev. Rul. 54-429, 1954-2 CUM. BULL. 53. The Tax Court rebelled at the
dichotomy between deduction and exclusion and in several cases allowed deductions to
employees who established that they moved for the convenience of the employer or to
avoid losing their job. The courts of appeals, however, backed the Commissioner's view.
See, e.g., Edward N. Wilson, 49 T.C. 406 (1968), rev'd, 412 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1969).
,' Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960.
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Therefore, despite the lack of theoretical support for it,
allocation as now required for certain foreign travel is probably
the most reasonable approach to all travel expenditures. There is
no reason this cannot also be applied to trips in search of a new
job or business opportunity. "[T]ravel, in search of employment
is as much an expense of carrying on the taxpayer's trade or
business as is the expense of a manufacturer who sends a
salesman in search of orders."'
77
Some protection against the allowance of even a partial
deduction when personal satisfaction is equal to cost could be
achieved by retaining the present principal purpose require-
ment. This test should be made objective by looking to how the
taxpayer spends his time. Not only will this reduce the incentive
for exaggeration or outright cheating, but it will also tend to
assure greater taxpayer acceptance of case-by-case results.178
Nevertheless, one has the uneasy feeling that the personal
satisfaction from many trips, during which a majority of time
could be said to be spent on business, will be equal to cost. This is
particularly true of such practices as attending conventions in
resort cities (especially when a desire to hold down costs would
not dictate the chosen site which may be far from the homes of
most of the participants),' 79 travel for education purposes'"0 and
lecture cruises.' 81 In these situations, business needs such as the
location of a particular customer do not determine the destina-
tion. In contrast, it is selected by either the taxpayer himself, a
group to which he belongs, or a promoter with the recreational
desires of the participants clearly in mind. If under present law a
trip to Pittsburgh 82 in search of a business opportunity is sus-
pect, how can a deduction be allowed for a trip to London by
lawyers attending the convention of the American Bar Associa-
tion?
177 Bittker, supra note 36, at 1167.
'17 See Klein, supra note 20, at 1111.
179 It is not even necessary for the convention's agenda to deal with matters within
the taxpayer's duties and responsibilities. Rev. Rul. 63-266, 1963-2 CuIm. BULL. 88. For a
warning against pushing one's luck too far, however, see T.I.R. 1275 (Feb. 14, 1974).
180 In one Tax Court case a world hiktory teacher was allowed a deduction for a tour
of France, while her husband, a Latin teacher, was unsuccessful. Stanley Marlin, 54 T.C.
560 (1970), acquiesced in, 1970-2 CuM. BULL. xx. While it may be true that the trip had
more of a relation to the wife's work, one suspects that the result is not a fair reflection of
the personal satisfaction each derived. See also John C. Ford, 56 T.C. 1300 (1971), aff'd
per curiam, 487 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1973) (taxpayer allowed a deduction for travel, meals
and lodging in connection with enrollment in a Ph.D. program in Norway; no evidence
offered as to reasons for not going to school in the United States).
181 For an indication that the Service is concerned about abuse in this area, see T.I.R.
1275 (Feb. 14, 1974).
182 Morton Frank, 20 T.C. 511, 512 (1953).
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An additional problem is distinguishing between the busi-
ness and pleasure components of a trip. The IRS rules are too
liberal in counting as a full business day any in which a majority
of the normal working hours are spent on business, or in which
any business meeting is held which the taxpayer is required to
attend. The regulations also count weekends and other reasona-
bly necessary standby days as business days when business is
conducted before and after the weekend. In such circumstances
the out-of-town stay may well be compelled by business reasons
and in some cases will not provide any personal satisfaction.
However, it is unnecessary to be so careful to avoid the possibility
that someone will be charged with personal satisfaction he did
not in fact enjoy.
An allocation rule should be adopted which would in all
cases, regardless of the taxpayer's control over the tripl"3 or his
purpose to obtain a vacation, permit a deduction only for a
portion of the travel fare in the same proportion to the entire
cost as time actually spent on business bears to the total time of
the trip.- For the purpose of computing the denominator of this
fraction, it would be sufficient to consider a day to have only
eight hours. An exception to the allocation rule could be pro-
vided when a trip takes only two or three days or if ninety
percent or more of this time is spent on business. It should also
be determined whether the more likely abuses can be sufficiently
isolated so as to permit the total denial of a deduction in such
circumstances.
The moving expense rules may be more liberal than this
proposal. However, since they are not subject to manipulation to
obtain tax-free recreation, it does not appear necessary to re-
commend a change at this time.
F. Food
1. The Law
There are circumstances in which a taxpayer can exclude
from income the value of food he consumes, or deduct the cost
of food if he has paid for it himself. Under the Code, the value
of meals consumed on the employer's business premises, fur-
nished for the convenience of the employer, is not taxable.18 4
MSee J. HELLERSTEIN, TAXES, "LoOPHOLES AND MORALS 141-42 (1963).
184 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 119. For unexplained reasons the Service continues to
sanction the exclusion of "supper money" from income although the meal is not
consumed on the employer's business premises. O.D. 514, 2 CUM. BULL. 90 (1920).
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Also, a deduction is allowed for the cost of meals purchased
while one is away from home overnight in the pursuit of a trade
or business. 18 5 The original administrative position was to allow
as a deduction the extra cost of such meals over what would have
been spent at home.186 However, the Service concluded very
soon that this was unadministrable, and asked that the statute be
amended to allow the entire cost to be deducted.
8 7
If the trip is primarily for business, generally its entire cost,
including the cost of meals on interim nonbusiness days such as
weekends, is deductible. However, if extra time is taken for a
vacation at the beginning or end of a trip, then the cost of meals
for the extra period is not deductible.1 8 8 Even if the trip away
from home is primarily personal so that travel fares are not
deductible, expenses while at the destination "properly allocable
to the taxpayer's trade or business," including meals, are
deductible.
18 9
There is a long standing dispute over what is meant by
"away from home." The Service asserts that a taxpayer's home is
his principal place of business, 90 but some courts insist that the
word must be given its normal everyday meaning. 19' However,
since most persons whose home is not located near their princi-
pal business location would, while working, be considered to be
away from home for personal rather than business reasons and
therefore denied a deduction, "in the overwhelming bulk of
cases"'92 the results would be the same. This is particularly true
since the Service agrees that a temporary change in business
location, generally for less than one year, does not change one's
principal place of business.193 Failure to move in such circum-
"5 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a)(2). See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299
(1967). The overnight rule may not be strictly enforced. Certainly no one fails to deduct
that portion of an airline ticket for a one day trip which is applicable to the meals
consumed in flight.
186T.D. 3101, 3 CUM. BULL. 191 (1920), amending Treas. -eg. 45, § 292 (1918).
187 See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 301 n.6 (1967). The change came in
1921. See Revenue Act of 1921, § 214(a)(1), 42 Stat. 239. Since 1962 there has been a
specific prohibition against a deduction for expenditures which are lavish or extravagant
under the circumstances.
"I Rev. Rul. 56-168, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 93; S. REP., supra note 10, at 34; cf. Treas.
Reg. § 1.162-5(e) (1967). The allocation rules applicable to certain travel under § 274(c)
could result in a disallowance of part of the cost of meals consumed while in travel status.
Rev. Rul. 63-144, 1963-2 CUM. BULL. 129, 142 q. 86.
189 Treas. Reg. § 1.]62-2(b)(1) (1958).
199 Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960-1 Cum. BULL.. 60, 61. The Supreme Court has accepted
this approach as to military personnel. Commissioner v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287 (1967).
1 See, e.g., Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
864 (1971).
12Id. at 911. See Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946).
193 Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 60.
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stances would not be deemed the result of personal choice.1 94
Therefore, persons who have temporarily relocated are away
from home under either approach if they are living apart from
their families. It is not yet clear.whether the courts which apply
the normal meaning to "home" would consider the taxpayer to
have moved if his family goes with him to the temporary
location.' 95 The Service apparently allows a deduction even if the
entire family moves.
One can also deduct the cost of meals, even though the
taxpayer is not away from home, if consumed in a business
context such as a lunch with a client or a testimonial dinner
whose primary purpose is business.1 96 The IRS states that only
the cost in excess of what would normally be spent should be
deductible. 97 However, despite the absence of a statutory rule as
in the away-from-home area, the IRS has for administrative
convenience generally allowed the full deduction. This is appar-
ently so even, for example, when a lawyer has lunch with a client
at the same restaurant in which the lawyer ate the previous day
with an old friend, although the Service reserves the right to
apply the correct rule in cases of "abuse."' 98
2. Analysis
Although everyone is going to eat whether or not he works,
experience indicates that people who work and therefore must
eat outside the home often spend more on food than those who
do not. Clothing presents a similar problem. However, there is a
willingness to assume that the additional cost of clothing is
accompanied by a like increase in personal satisfaction or, at
least, that it is better to presume that value equals cost rather
than undertake the task of ascertaining the amount of any
difference. This same reasoning explains the denial of a deduc-
tion for the cost of lunch in a restaurant made necessary, or at
194 See Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905, 912 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
864 (1971).
193See Six v. United States, 450 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1971). If the taxpayer is
considered to have moved then the cost of transporting himself and his family would be a
moving expense and not a travel expense. See Treas. Reg. § 1.217-2(c)(3)(iii) (1972).
196Rev. Rul. 63-144, 1963-2 CUM. BULL. 129, 135.
197 The Tax Court reached this result in Richard A. Sutter, 21 T.C. 170, 173 (1953),
acquiesced in, 1954-1 CUM. BULL. 6.
198 According to Rev. Rul. 63-144, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 129, 135, "abuse" means
attempting to deduct a substantial amount of personal living costs. The Second Circuit,
while prepared, following Richard A. Sutter, 21 T.C. 170 (1953), to deny a deduction for
the cost of the taxpayer's own lunch at a hospital cafeteria, permitted the taxpayer on
remand "to press his claim ... that this case does not fall into [the abuse] category." La
Forge v. Commissioner, 434 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1970).
19741
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:859
least appropriate, by the fact that one is away from home during
the noon hour because of work.
However, the away-from-home and convenience-of-em-
ployer doctrines take a different approach. Since circum-
stances compel the individual to eat where he might not choose
to eat if given a free choice, it seems reasonable to assume that
the taxpayer may not obtain satisfaction equal to the full cost of
the meal. Rather than overtax the employee by assuming benefit
equal to cost, or undertake the burden of determining the
amount the individual would be willing to pay for the meal if not
subject to business compulsion, the Code allows a full deduction
or exemption. This is similar to the treatment of uniforms, which
are also assumed to provide no personal satisfaction.
3. Evaluation
In the case of college, professional education or business
clothing, the general approach is to deny any deduction despite
the possibility that personal benefits may not equal cost. Food
should be treated in a similar manner. Because of the substitu-
ion for other meals, the existence of some personal satisfaction is
almost certain. Since, in many instances, one can enjoy a meal in
a business setting as much as otherwise, such value probably
approaches cost.1 99
It is true that the tax treatment of meals away from home
affects relatively few people and the consequences of an exag-
geration of satisfaction could be seriously inequitable. This is
particularly true since the more meals one eats away from home,
the more likely- it is that a low value will be attached to such
meals. On the other hand, those who can deduct a large portion
of their food costs have an extreme advantage, particularly in
light of the assumption under the present law of no personal
satisfaction at all.
This advantage may result from there being no extra cost at
all for a business meal. As stated above, the taxpayer may eat in
the same restaurant whether the lunch is business or personal. A
Yale professor spending a year visiting at Harvard may eat his
meals in Cambridge at home with his family at the same cost he
would have in New Haven.2 °0 Moreover, although one spends
199 But see Hearings, supra note 8, at 1614 (testimony on behalf of National Restaurant
Association to the effect that people do not enjoy business meals).200 See Lester E. Wood, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 976 (1958). Taxpayer moved from.
job site to job site in a trailer in which he lived with his wife. Although costs were
identical, at one job site he was considered to be away from home while at another he was
not.
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more while away from home, satisfaction may well increase by a
like amount.
Even if the law could be amended to identify more accu-
rately those cases where personal satisfaction is likely to be
unequal to the amount expended, it would still be iinequitable to
deduct the full cost whenever any excess expenditure exists.
Administrative convenience may justify such a rule when there is
an occasional business meal, but the result is outrageous when
the Yale professor can deduct the entire cost of his food for a
year.
To avoid these inconsistencies, there should be a complete
denial of deductions for the cost of food. As a less drastic
alternative, there should be an attempt to identify the extra cost
of business meals which may be unlikely to increase the satisfac-
tion over that which is obtained from eating at home. For
example, suppose an ordinary dinner would cost $3 at home,
while a similar meal in a "simple" restaurant costs $10. If an
individual were eating dinner out solely for business reasons, it
would be reasonable to assume that the extra $7 does not
increase consumption. On the other hand, a $25 meal is likely to
be more elaborate than the usual dinner at home. It is possible,
of course, that a person would prefer to eat the simpler meal
with his family and would, in the absence of business compul-
sion, pay nothing for the fancy dinner. Still, it is much closer to
the truth to assume that at least the extra cost of a luxury meal
produces personal satisfaction, than to conclude that there has
been no personal benefit. It would be logical, under these as-
sumptions, to permit a deduction for all costs in excess of $3 up
to $10 for dinner. For simplicity, this could be converted into a
uniform maximum deduction of $7 per dinner.20 1 To give
greater assurance that deductible costs are those due to a change
in living pattern caused by travel away from home, no deduction
should be allowed except for restaurant meals,20 2 and then only
201 President Kennedy's 1961 proposals are consistent with this suggestion. He
recommended a ceiling of $4 to $7 per day for the cost of meals while at home, and a
maximum deduction for food and lodging while away from home equal to twice the per
diem allowance for government employees. Hearings, supra note 8, at 283-84. At that time
the government per diem allowance was $12 per day with an increase to $15 having been
proposed. Id. The current amount for travel in the United States of $36 per day,
Standardized Government Travel Regulations, July 1, 1972, is a closer approximation of
reality and a deduction for double that amount would seem unnecessarily generous. Cf.
Rev. Rul. 72-508, 1972-2 Cum!. BULL. 200 (employee is considered to have accounted to
employer for expense allowance if amount does not exceed $36 per day or per diem rate
authorized by federal government in the particular locality). Previously 125% of the
federal per diem rate met this test, as did a maximum of $25 per day, although the per
diem rate was $16. Rev. Rul. 65-212, 1965-2 CuM. BULL. 84.
202 An exception could be provided for an individual who has two jobs and lives with
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for breakfast and dinner since lunch is often eaten outside the
home. Section 119 should be amended to limit the exclusion to
the amount that would be deductible under section 162 for
meals while away from home.
G. Lodging
1. The Law
Cost of lodging while away from home in pursuit of a trade
or business is deductible in those circumstances in which meals
are deductible. 1°3 Similarly, lodging costs can be excluded from
income under section 119 of the Code if the lodging is provided
for the convenience of the employer, and the employee is re-
quired to accept lodging on the employer's business premises as
a condition of employment. 0
2. Analysis
An individual will not derive any personal satisfaction from
an ordinary hotel room if he has no personal interest in a visit to
the location to which he is traveling on business. However, if the
taxpayer desires to travel to the city in question for recreation,
sightseeing or visiting relatives, he has obtained some consump-
tion which current law tends to overlook.
If an individual has no other living quarters available, it is
likely that he will obtain some satisfaction from lodging on the
employer's premises or away from home. However, because of
the restrictions imposed by a temporary change of location, the
Yale professor visiting at Harvard for a year may be forced to
pay more for housing than he would if he were permanently
located in the Boston area. Moreover, living on the employer's
premises, particularly in an institutional setting, may not provide
personal satisfaction equal to cost. In these circumstances, since
the satisfaction is probably less than cost, the assumption is made
that there is no personal benefit.
205
his family at the secondary job location. The Service would allow a deduction for the costs
of living at home. Rev. Rul. 55-604, 1955-2 GuM. BULL. 49. This is legitimate, because this
taxpayer does eat a substantial number of nondeductible meals in a restaurant at the
primary location, and if the family moved to the primary business location, the individual
would probably eat in a restaurant while at the secondary location.
203 INT REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a)(2).
204 Id. § 119(2).
205 Simons points out that those who own their homes obtain tax-free income at least
equal to the cost of housing, because of the failure to tax the imputed value of their home
and the allowance of a deduction for interest and taxes. Is it not fair, he suggests, to give
a similar advantage to those who, because of the nature of their job, do not have the free
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3. Evaluation
It is possible to assume that food or entertainment results in
personal satisfaction equal to its cost, because the enjoyment
comes from the event itself. Travel, on the other hand, ordinar-
ily provides satisfaction only if you desire to reach the particular
destination. While a luxurious suite in a good hotel may provide
enjoyment in itself, lodging is close to travel in that the benefit
greatly depends on the location and on the ability to spend the
day in personal pursuits. Thus, some housing costs must be
deductible.
Nevertheless, if the lodging is located at a place the taxpayer
is likely to visit on vacation, as when a convention is held at a
resort hotel, there is a strong likelihood of personal consumption
equal to cost. This could be so even if the taxpayer really does
spend the day on business, if the area's attraction is its after-dark
activities. Thus, if it were possible to isolate such cases for the
purpose of denying any deduction for fares,2 0 6 a similar denial
would be justified for the cost of meals and lodging.
In any event, lodging attributable to days during which
business was not actively conducted should not be deductible.
While this may overstate consumption when the taxpayer is
unavoidably detained for business reasons in a town with no
personal attraction, such a rule is a reasonable compromise.
Moreover, while a temporary change in location may indeed
prevent the most economical acquisition of housing, it is closer to
reality to assume that personal satisfaction from the taxpayer's
only dwelling equals cost and to insist, as a condition for the
deduction of lodging, that the taxpayer be maintaining another
household. This is consistent with the refusal to allow any deduc-
tion for meals and lodging while "away from home" to an
unmarried traveling salesman who has no permanent place of
abode. 7 Similar reasoning suggests the repeal of section 119 as
it relates to housing. However, the exclusion could be retained
since it is likely that in many cases the personal satisfaction from
institutional housing is greatly below cost. Moreover, probably a
great many of the beneficiaries of section 119 are relatively low
income people who are not able to take advantage of other tax
concessions.
choice to rent or buy. H. SIMONS, supra note 7, at 123-24. Perhaps so, but it would be
better to eliminate the tax advantages of home ownership, as Simons would no doubt
agree.20
0 See text accompanying notes 179-82 supra.
207 Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864
(1971). See Rev. Rul. 73-529, 1973 INT. REV. BULL. No. 49, at 9.
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In those cases where a deduction is to be allowed for
housing, a strong case can be made for a dollar limitation.20 8 For
situations in which the taxpayer does actually obtain personal
satisfaction from the entire expenditure, this will restrict the
amount of consumption which can be enjoyed tax free. In other
instances, even though apart from business a person would not
pay anything for the opportunity to spend a night in an ordinary
hotel room, it is possible he would spend something for a
luxurious suite. This seems especially appropriate if the accom-
modations far surpass those he has at home. The dollar limit will
serve as a means of denying a deduction for that portion of the
cost which is more likely to provide personal satisfaction.20 9
H. Entertainment
1. The Law
Prior to 1962, expenditures for entertainment at night clubs,
parties or sporting events were deductible, provided the princi-
pal purpose of any particular expenditure was business. 210 Simi-
larly, a portion of depreciation and other costs for maintenance
of a yacht or hunting lodge, or a portion of country club dues,
was deductible in the ratio of business use to total use of the
facility. In part because one's friends are also often one's busi-
ness associates, and because a subjective test relating to the
primary purpose of an expenditure is difficult to administer, the
deduction was believed to have been substantially abused. 21' As
previously stated, President Kennedy proposed that, except for
limited exceptions, deductions be denied for expenditures on
entertainment, for social club dues and for facilities used primar-
ily for entertainment or recreation.212 Congress responded only
208 As noted, President Kennedy in 1961 recommended a maximum limit on deduc-
tions for meals and lodging while away from home equal to twice the federal per diem
rate. If this had been adopted the limit would now be $72 per day. See note 201 supra.
2
09 See subsection III 5(b), Job Facilities, supra.
'See Robert Lee Henry, 36 T.C. 879 (1961). Other cases do not refer to the
principal purpose requirement. See, e.g., Sanitary Farms Dairy, Inc., 25 T.C. 463 (1955),
acquiesced in, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 8. Thus in 1962 the Senate was able to say that "[u]nder
present law, where a business purpose, however slight, exists then the entertainment
expenses generally are fully deductible if they are 'ordinary and necessary' business
expenses." S. REP., supra note 10, at 25, 1962-3 CuM. BULL. 731.
2 11 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, STUDY ON ENTERTAINMENT EXPENSES (1961),
reprinted as Exhibit V to Statement of Secretary of the Treasury Dillon in Hearings, supra
note 8, at 133-215.
212 Hearings, supra note 8, at 2 82-86. President Kennedy's recommendations regard-
ing food and lodging are described at note 201 supra. He also proposed an allocation of
travel expense similar to what is now in effect for foreign travel under § 274(c) of the
Code. See text accompanying note 165 supra. In addition, he suggested the nondeductibil-
ity of business gifts in excess of $10 per year per recipient which is now reflected in the
$25 ceiling on business gifts in § 274(b) of the Code.
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by seeking to require the taxpayer to show "a greater degree of
proximate relation between the expenditure and his trade or
business than is required under present law. 213
The most important reform was the requirement that ex-
penditures for travel, entertainment and gifts be substantiated by
adequate records or by other sufficient evidence corroborating
the taxpayer's own statement.21 4 No longer were courts to make
an approximation when evidence indicated some deductible ex-
penditures were made, but there was no evidence of the amount.
In such cases, the entertainment expenses were to be disallowed
entirely. The so-called Cohan rule was dead.
2 15
Once the expenditure is adequately substantiated, most of
what was deductible under prior law will remain so. Cost of
entertainment preceding or following a substantial business dis-
cussion is generally deductible,21 6 and this will include the ex-
pense attributable to the spouse of a person who engaged in the
discussion.21 7 If the entertainment is not associated with a busi-
ness discussion then it must be established that the item was
"directly related to-. . . the active conduct of the taxpayer's trade
or business." 21 8 The regulations define the meaning of this test
in a rambling manner not conducive to easy understanding, but
it is fair to say that they generally require a showing that the
taxpayer had a specific business benefit in mind which he could
reasonably expect to further by discussion or other means, such
as product display or publicity, aside from whatever goodwill was
developed by showing the other party a good time. Thus, deduc-
tions have been denied for boat trips.where the taxpayer did not
219 hraccompany potential customers, or where he did not initiate
business discussions, preferring the "soft sell. '220 The cost of
cocktail parties was also disallowed on the ground that the
circumstances were not conducive to business discussions.
221
Operating and maintenance expenditures and depreciation
of property used in connection with entertainment are deducti-
ble only to the extent use of the facility is "directly related" to the
213 H.R. REP., supra note 12, at 20, 1962-3 CuM. BULL. 424. See Revenue Act of 1962,
Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 4, 76 Stat. 960.
214 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 274(d).
215 H.R. REP., supra note 12, at 23, 1962-3 CUM. BULL. 427. See note 13 supra.
216 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 274(a)(1)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(d) (1963).
217 Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(d)(2) (1963).
218 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 274(a)(1)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c) (1963).
2 19 D.A. Foster Trenching Co. v. United States, 473 F.2d 1398 (Ct. C1. 1973).
220 Hippodrome Oldsmobile, Inc. v. United States, 474 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'g
339 F. Supp. 826 (M.D. Tenn. 1972).
221 St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 674 (M.D. Fla.
1973).
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taxpayer's business, and only if the primary use of the facility
during the year was for purposes considered ordinary and
necessary under section 162 or 212. The same rule applies to
dues paid to social or athletic organizations.222 These stricter
tests do not affect expenditures for a particular item of enter-
tainment, such as a meal at a golf club or a particular fishing trip,
to which the rules discussed above apply.
223
2. Analysis
Even with the 1962 amendments, present law seems to be
directed solely toward a determination of the business purpose
of the expenditure. Once the business purpose is found, the
possibility of personal benefit is ignored. Section 274 does, how-
ever, serve to increase the certainty that significant business
benefits exist. For example, if more than one-half of the use of a
facility, such as a yacht, is for business purposes, there is some
assurance that the taxpayer acquired it in connection with his
business.
3. Evaluation
As the prior discussion indicates, no deduction should be
allowed for expenditures on entertainment. That portion of
expenditures on entertainment which is intended as a price
rebate to a customer or a kickback to the customer's employees
clearly ought to be taxable to the recipient, or in lieu thereof
nondeductible. If instead of providing entertainment prices were
cut, the customer would have lower costs and higher taxable
income. Entertainment is just a means of obtaining a part of that
income in a tax-favored way. This causes entertainment to be
preferred even if not valued at full cost. If entertainment were
not deductible, unless it provided satisfaction equal to cost, it
would be more efficient to reduce prices directly, thereby
eliminating competitive pressure to provide entertainment.
The analysis is more difficult with respect to the portion of
the cost applicable to the taxpayer or its employees, or as to
entertainment which is intended to develop and maintain cus-
tomer goodwill and does not have any direct effect on prices
because, for example, it replaces other costs such as advertising.
Nevertheless, examination of such entertainment under the
guidelines suggested in this Article leads one to a like conclusion.
22 Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(e)(3)(ii) (1963).
222 Treas. Reg. § 1.2 7 4-2(e)(3)(iii)(a) (1963).
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The proximate relationship between entertainment and in-
creased income is more difficult to establish than it is with any of
the other items previously discussed. Conversely, unlike these
other items, entertainment cannot be productive unless someone
derives personal satisfaction from it. The business context does
not necessarily interfere with personal enjoyment. While it is
true that the personal satisfaction of many people would increase
if they went to a night club with their spouses rather than with a
customer, attendance of spouses would in many cases under
present law not prevent the deduction..2 24 Moreover, even if the
taxpayer's satisfaction does not equal cost, he may still be indif-
ferent to the effect on potential customers.
For example, suppose that a stock broker desires to go to a
football game for which the tickets cost $15. If he is in the fifty
percent bracket and the cost is deductible, for $15 he can buy
two tickets. Thus, he might well take a client to the game even if
the potential of additional business is slight. Similar arithmetic
may cause a high bracket taxpayer to undertake certain activities
which he would otherwise not believe to be worth the cost, if
inviting a customer alcng could make the cost deductible without
appreciably increasing the expense. For example, a chartered
yacht for a day may cost $1,000, while the taxpayer is only
willing to spend $600. If the cost is deductible, the out-of-pocket
expenditure will be $500. In this case, the fact that the taxpayer
does not obtain $1,000 of personal satisfaction does not show
business must have been a motivating factor.
Finally, as previously discussed, it seems reasonable to re-
solve doubt in favor of risking overstatement of income rather
than accepting the serious understatement that occurs from
assuming no personal satisfaction from business enter-
tainment. 225 Expense account living, encouraged by absence of
tax, undoubtedly affects the morale of those who are unable to
share in the benefits. The apparent absence of any serious effects
from the limitations on deductibility imposed in 1962 may indi-
cate that further restrictions will not greatly endanger business
efficiency. In fact, efficiency may be increased by less reliance on
entertainment. Even if total disallowance seems too drastic a
step, the fact that some personal benefit undoubtedly exists
should be acknowledged by denying a deduction for some por-
tion of all entertainment expenditures. The deductible part
would reflect the assumed cost in excess of satisfaction.
224 See Rev. Rul. 63-144, 1963-2CuMt. BULL. 129, 134-35.
225 See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
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V. CONCLUSION
An examination of existing law in light of the principle that
deductions should be limited to the excess of cost over personal
satisfaction has led to the following recommendations:
Education: Allow amortization of the cost of professional and
certain other postgraduate education and vocational training
after high school.
Job seeking: Allow a deduction for, or amortization of, job-
seeking costs not involving travel or education.
Clothing: No change in present law.
Office in the home: Deny a deduction unless the principal
purpose of acquiring the space is business. Unless personal use is
insignificant; the deduction when allowable should be based
upon the ratio of business use to total hours in the period.
Travel: Extend allocation rule of section 274(c) of the Code
to all travel, including the cost of seeking employment. The
deduction permitted would be in the ratio of time spent on
business to total time on the trip. Attention should be devoted to
an effort to limit the portion of the trip allocated to business to
the actual time so spent. Consideration should be given to
whether a deduction can be fully denied for certain trips, e.g.,
conventions at vacation spots, which appear to result in personal
satisfaction equal to cost. If so, meals and lodging on such
occasions also should not be deductible.
Food: Deny all deductions for the cost of food. If this is not
acceptable, do not allow a deduction for food consumed in the
home or for lunches wherever they take place. Place a low dollar
limit on deductions for breakfast and dinner. The exclusion
under section 119 for meals provided for the convenience of the
employer should be consistent with the dollar limit.
Lodging: Deny a deduction unless lodging duplicates housing
otherwise available and in all cases for days not spent on busi-
ness. A dollar limit should apply.
Entertainment: Deny any deduction.
Corporations and other business taxpayers would be al-
lowed to deduct. disallowed items if income is allocated to indi-
viduals designated by the filing of information returns.
Obviously, most of what has been proposed would require
legislation-because of the clear indications of congressional
satisfaction with some existing rules, and because it seems impos-
sible to impose dollar limits without statutory guidelines.
Nevertheless, in some areas it is possible for the courts and the
DEDUCTIBILITY OF PERSONAL EXPENSES
Service without action by Congress to modify the law in accor-
dance with the principle of allowing business expenditures to be
deductible except to the extent personal satisfaction is obtained.
The recent loosening with respect to employment agency fees
may indicate a general liberalization in the whole area of ex-
.penses preparatory to working. Allowing the amortization of
certain 'educational expenses seems within the province of the
courts, since there is no conflicting legislation or well-considered
judicial precedent. Disallowance of the cost of meals and lodging
to a taxpayer living in a private residence with his family,
temporarily away from his permanent business location, may
result from the Second Circuit decision in Rosenspan22 6 which
suggests that such a taxpayer is not "away from home." A
tightening of the rules with respect to a deduction for a home
office also seems within the realm of the courts or the Service,
since neither they nor Congress have really faced the issues
involved in this deduction. For the big task, travel and enter-
tainment, action by Congress is needed, and it is time it got on
with the job.
22 6 Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864
(1971).
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